

G E I T O N I E S

Generating Interethnic Tolerance and Neighbourhood Integration in European Urban Spaces

European Commission

FP7

THESSALONIKI

CITY REPORT

prepared by

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Part A - The City in Context

Thessaloniki, the second Greek city, embraces the Gulf of Thermaikos at the north part of the country. The historian Mark Mazower (2004: 12) has evocatively described it as 'A forest of densely-packed apartment blocks and giant advertising billboards sprouted where in living memory had been cypresses and minarets, stables, owls and storks.' His description points to all that make it today a city of (yesterday's) ghosts, i.e. its 500 years multi-ethnic history, from its conquest by the Ottomans in 1430 to the elimination of the erstwhile prevalent Jewish element by the Nazis during the Second World War. Since then it evolved into an expanding southern metropolis exhibiting most of the characteristics of the classic Mediterranean city (Leontidou 1990; 1996), perhaps with exception of history, which has been almost totally erased from its cement-dominated landscape. Today, it appears to be regaining part of its lost multicultural character, as it increasingly hosts people of diverse origins and becomes a new home for migrants from Western Europe, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world.

The present report comes to investigate these latest developments, relating to the place of immigrants in the city and the emerging urban social geography. It brings together existing literature and past empirical research, which it combines with a wide range of statistical data, drawing though mostly on a detailed dataset from the 2001 Census. This preliminary analysis is a necessary step in the three-year project GEITONIES, which intends to cast a comparative eye in the patterns of interaction and everyday contact in increasingly multiethnic neighbourhoods of sic European cities, including Lisbon, Bilbao, Rotterdam, Vienna and Warsaw.

The report starts with an overview of the context of migration to Greece, in order to locate the case of Thessaloniki within its broader national parameters. In this first chapter (Part A), therefore, we outline the basics of the Greek immigration policy framework, its ideological grounding in the public discourse, and aspects of policy at the local level. The second chapter (Part B) moves on to take a closer look at the local context, by defining the city, its territorial and administrative structures, its key socio-spatial units and demographic profile; it also explains the data used in the report, their sources and the methodologies employed. Part C is about the urban economy, society and geography: it builds on statistical analysis to identify the key socio-economic trends and their spatial dimension, in order to explore the position of migrants in the city. This is in turn studied in detail in Part D, which maps the city's immigrants and draws their profile, locating the relative weight of particular groups in specific neighbourhoods. The overall results and our respective interpretations and insights are summarised in the concluding chapter (Part E) closing the report.

A.1. Policy background at the national level

Greek post-war mobility patterns are very complex and exemplify all major forms of migration. A major historical change that broke with long established migration traditions is the country's turnaround from a source area for emigration, to a target area for immigration. This shift is rooted back in the mid-1970s but gathered momentum in the 1990s. Greece's immigration transition can be placed in the framework of King's "Southern European model"¹ (see King et al. 1997; King 2000) yet the massiveness and suddenness of the phenomenon in the 1990s is exceptional to South European experience. The dramatic rise in immigration

¹ King's model emphasises specific features of the south European economy along with the gradual cease of rural-urban migration in all countries as well as common demographic trends and social changes.

during that decade was closely connected to the disintegration of the former Communist bloc.

Particularly, in 1972 when 300.000 emigrants were working in Germany, Greece had already attracted 15.000 to 20.000 immigrants (Nikolinakos 1973). Inflows from Africa and Asia and subsequently from Eastern Europe continued but almost two decades later the immigrant population rate of the country remained rather modest, less than 2% of the total population. It was during the 1990's when mass undocumented immigration from the Balkans, notably Albania, and the "return" of ethnic Greeks coming from former Soviet Union, transformed Greece into a major immigration country. The immigrant population in 2005 was estimated at 1,15 million people, including ethnic Greeks and undocumented migrants, which accounts for more than 10% of the total population (Baldwin Edwards 2005); this is one of the highest immigrant population rates among EU member states. Besides the country's sudden transformation to a mass destination, Greek immigration experience is also exceptional in terms of the dominance of a single group, Albanians (who constitute half of the immigrant population); the extended clandestine entry and residence of immigrants (especially throughout the 1990s); and the return of the "old" Greek Diaspora, predominantly from the former USSR and Albania.

The immigration "boom" of the 1990s found the Greek administrative structure significantly unprepared and the legislative framework based on an archaic Law from 1929. The new immigration Law, designed by the Ministry of Public Order, aimed at controlling immigration and bringing Greece in line with the strict EU directions. The "Aliens" Law of 1991, entitled "Entrance-exit, sojourn, employment, expulsion of aliens, determination of refugee status and other provisions", set "zero immigration" as the policy goal. That was attempted through stricter border controls, criminalisation of illegal entry and simplification of expulsion procedures, while possibilities for regulated entry were further restricted. Despite of (or, more precisely, because of) such a restrictive policy response six years after the new immigration Law, 90% of the approximately 700,000 immigrants living in Greece were irregulars (Apostolatou 2005). Although the official line continued to be that "Greece is not a country of immigration" having failed to restrict undocumented immigration, the Greek state adopted a first regularisation programme in 1997². Two presidential degrees were promulgated on November 1997 and the legalisation began on January 1998.

The first Presidential Degree had two aims: the registration of aliens residing illegally in Greece and the initiation of a process which would lead to legalisation. Those who concluded the registration procedure successfully and within the deadline were to be granted so-called white cards, temporary resident permits which would enable them to enter the second phase of the legalization process (Papadoniou-Fragouli & Leventi 2000: 951). To acquire the white card immigrants had only to prove illegal residence before the threshold date of 23 November 1997. The major requirement for the subsequent green card, which equalled to renewable work and residence permit, was documentation indicating that the immigrant had been legally employed since January 1, and had earned an income equivalent to at least half of the earnings of an unqualified worker for 40 days, that is 40 social security stamps. For the renewal of the permit 150 social security stamps were required which also met the requirements for full social security coverage.

The deadline for the application for the Green card eventually expired in April 1999 after it has been moved forward four times as a result of flawed organisation³. At the end, only 337,000 registered for the white card of which 135,000 did not apply for the green card or did not renew the permit. This demonstrates the difficulty of immigrants to submit the necessary certificates mainly due to refusal of employers to hire them legally and pay their social

² It is worth noting that in order to curb illegal migration, bilateral agreements for the exchange of seasonal labour were signed with Bulgaria (1996) and Albania (1997), which however failed to meet their goals (Fakiolas 2003: 542).

³ Indicative of the administrative insufficiency in the regularisation process is also the fact that it took up to two years for the Greek state institutions to issue these permits.

insurance contributions⁴. Failing to resolve the problem, a second regularisation was applied in 2001. This aimed at legalising more immigrants by embracing the “pay-and-stay” principal. The purchase of 250 social-security stamps was introduced as alternative criterion for eligibility and further high fees were charged at every stage of the issue and renewal procedures. In practice anyone had the opportunity to get access to the second regularisation by paying their contributions to the funds. According to Fakiolas (2003:540), by June 2003 approximately 580,000 immigrants had legalised their status.

Regularisation turned out to be a crucial point in the lives of immigrants in Greece (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Hatziprokopiou 2003; Pratsinakis 2005). Legal residence was accompanied by the entitlement of rights equal to those of Greek citizens in the labour market (excluding tenured positions in the public sector), full civil rights but no voting rights. Voting rights, even for municipal elections, are connected to Greek citizenship and so do disability and subsistence welfare programmes. As long as resident permits are tight to social security contributions, legal immigrants are granted full social security coverage. On the contrary all public services and legal persons under public law, as well as notaries are obliged to refrain from offering their services to undocumented immigrants (Skordas 2002:43). Exception to this obligation is hospitals, sanatoriums and clinics for emergency cases and medical care to children, while immigrant children have equal and unlimited access to education irrespective of their parents’ legal status.

The second regularisation programme was part of a broader immigration Law voted in 2001. Immigration control policy measures were further strengthened along with an attempt to regulate entry by setting annual quotas for (legal) entrance, residence and work, accompanied by severe penalties for offences related to smuggling and trafficking of people, or to employing illegal immigrants (Mavroudi 2005:10,11). At the same time, the new Law included certain measures pointing to a long term migration policy. Indicative is the fact that the coordination of policy was passed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while the Law itself referred for the first time explicitly, albeit rather vaguely, to the question of integration. The 2001 law established more favourable provisions regarding the right to family reunification and the acquisition of long term residence. However those provisions remained still exclusionary and naturalisation procedures became even more cumbersome by the 2001 law⁵. It is almost impossible for immigrants of non-Greek descent to acquire citizenship, as illustrated by the fact that only 13,500 people managed to naturalize in the period 1985-2003 (Christopoulos 2007:267). According to the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index of 2004, Greece’s performance over five strands of EU policy indicators - Labour Market Inclusion, Long Residence, Nationality, Anti-Discrimination, Family Reunion - is well below the European average.

The most recent immigration bill on the *‘Entry, stay and integration of third country nationals in Greece’* passed in August 2005. This new legislation followed the logic of the 2001 law with the objective to rationalise the co-ordination of Greece’s immigration policy, simplify procedures and cut red-tape (Triandafyllidou 2007). The core innovative features include unifying residence and work permits into one document, clarifying family re-unification conditions and long-term residence, addressing the status of victims of human trafficking and strengthening regional migration commissions. Since many legal immigrants lapsed again to illegality a third legalisation was applied in 2005 a fourth one, with additional amendments in 2007. In October 2007, according to data of the Ministry of the interior (Theodorides 2007:15) 481.500 immigrants possessed legal permits.

⁴ For a detailed analysis on the reasons why illegal immigrants did not apply see Fakiolas (2003).

⁵ The criterion of minimal continuous residency was reduced from 5 to 2 years for family reunification and from 15 to 10 years for long term residence permits. For naturalisation the minimal continuous residency is also 10 year and conditions include: sufficient knowledge of Greek language, history and culture and a fee of 1500 euros. Decisions are not justified in case of rejection (Tsitselikis 2007: 150).

Regarding the few integration programmes implemented to date, these have reached only a negligible proportion of the regularised population⁶. The Greek government issued for the first time in 2001 a three-year *Action Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants for the period 2002-2005*. This Plan included measures for inclusion in the labour market, improved access to health services and overall a series of measures promoting cultural dialogue and combating xenophobia and racism within Greek society (Triandafyllidou 2007). Yet, the implementation of the plan never took place and such initiatives are primarily carried out by NGOs. In November 2007 a new governmental plan for the social integration of immigrants was announced for the period 2007-2013, with a budget of 19.6 million Euros⁷.

The fragmented and exclusionary policy framework described above did not target all immigrants in Greece. The Greek state has distinguished between immigrants of Greek ethnic origin and others, grounding its immigration policies in *jus sanguinis*. The terms *genos* (descent), which is a key defining element of Greekness, is a legal category separating between those of Greek descent and those who are not. The first category, *homogenis*, are deemed Greek regardless of their actual citizenship status; the latter group, *allogenis* (=foreign), are non-Greek, even if they possess Greek citizenship (Tsitselikis, 2007: 147). Immigration policy has been much more favourable for *homogenis* immigrants who account for almost one third of the immigrant population⁸. The category of *homogenis* includes two major immigrant groups, ethnic Greek immigrants from Albania and the so-called “home-returnees” (*palinnotoundes*) from the former Soviet Union. The first group refers to Albanian citizens of Greek ethnic origin and Christian Orthodox religion, mainly from Southern Albania. The latter refers to the Greek Diaspora of the former Soviet Union, mostly to the so-called Pontic Greeks who claim their origin to be in ‘Pontos’ (the Black Sea coast of Turkey)⁹.

Even though the state’s intention has been to limit the naturalisation of *allogenis* immigrants, access to citizenship rights has been given to Soviet Greeks as a welcoming gesture for their “repatriation” to the motherland. Considered as an important resource for the country’s economy and demography, “a settlement plan was implemented inspired by the “irreplaceable achievement” that is the successful settlement of the Minor Asia refugees of the 1923 compulsory population exchange” (Voutira 2004:535). A ministerial decision in 1990 aimed to ease and regulate the acquisition of citizenship by Soviet Greeks, defined as “a specific case” by a 1993 law. Soviet Greeks who wished to acquire Greek citizenship could apply through a so-called “verification of nationality” procedure. By means of a summary mode of acquisition, citizenship rights were granted on proof of the applicant’s descent through documents certified by the Greek consular authorities in the country of origin. The investigation of the applicant’s “Greek national consciousness” was introduced as a supplementary criterion in 2000. Soviet Greeks, who do not wish to acquire Greek citizenship in order not to lose their existing one, are provided with a special “card of *homogenis*”. This is tantamount to semi-citizenship, which grants them all but voting rights.

⁶ For example the Operational Programme “Combating exclusion from the labor market” which was carried out between 1997 and 2001, containing comprehensive, integrated measures with elements such as “pre-training” and Greek language instruction, and the language instruction program of 2002-2003. Both programmes scheduled to reach an estimated 6000 beneficiaries (Cavounides 2006).

⁷ Information obtained from the newspaper Eleftherotypia of 13 November 2007

(http://www.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=112.dt=13.11.2007.id=28454824, accessed on 2/6/2008).

⁸ Soviet Greek migrants are estimated at about 180.000 people, the majority of whom have acquired the Greek citizenship, while Greek Albanians count approximately 200.000 people (Christopoulos, 2007: 272-3).

⁹ Pontic Greeks had left Pontos for Russia in various waves during the 19th century and at the turbulence of 1914 to 1923 related to ethnic conflicts and the rise of nationalism in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. After the Greco-Turkish war in 1922 and following the population exchanges between the two countries, their homeland completely was deserted, and they fled either to Greece as political refugees or to neighbouring Russia. The Pontic Diaspora of the former Soviet Union was dispersed in small cultural enclaves in South Russia, South Caucasus and later in Central Asia where they had been deported during the Stalinist era. Formally, Pontic Greeks are referred to as “repatriates” (*palinnotoundes*), which is actually an incorrect term as they are not returning to their native land since they never lived in Greece.

In addition to the Greek government's generosity towards the citizenship acquisition of Soviet Greeks, favourable policies for employment, housing and social integration (including Greek language courses) were also developed. Those policies reached a small segment of the actual Soviet Greek population and practically provided marginal help. The National Foundation "for the Reception and Rehabilitation of Emigrant and Repatriate Co-Ethnic Greeks" (EIYAAΠOIE), which was established in 1990, prioritized a settlement plan. During the first years a rural settlement plan was implemented in Thrace, where the Greek Muslim minority lives. The motivation behind that policy was to change the population structure of this department in favour of the Christian citizens. However the lack of job opportunities in that area as well as insufficient funding brought this scheme to a failure. Subsequently there was shift of the earlier model of agricultural settlement towards a more flexible subsidized self settlement scheme in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. Yet, this plan was also reconsidered since the majority of newcomers preferred to settle in urban areas or close to urban areas where opportunities are much greater (Voutira 2004: 537). The last measure was introduced by the 2790/2000 law which prescribed the distribution of housing loans of 60,000 Euros per family, of "returning" *homogenis* from the former Soviet Union. Such loans were given in the period of 2001 to 2005.

In the case of Greek Albanians the Greek government had to balance its policy between the proclaimed moral obligation towards co-ethnics and political considerations according to which Greek Albanians are more important for the nation outside the state's territory rather than within it (Pratsinakis 2008). In particular the continuous presence of the Greek minority in Albania is considered vital for the promotion of Greek interests in the neighbouring country. Fearing the perceived threat of Albania withdrawing Albanian citizenship from those who eventually acquire Greek citizenship, the Greek policy attempts to prevent the acquisition of Greek citizenship by *homogenis* from Albania (Tsitelikis 2007:156). Their status was clarified in 1998 when they were granted a special "card of *homogenis*". Although they are given preferential status as people without Greek citizenship but with Greek nationality, they receive fewer benefits than the Soviet Greeks and they have no voting rights. Therefore, in the Greek policy framework, rights are distributed according to ideologies of nationhood and political interests of the Greek state. This has produced a hierarchy of immigrant groups with varying status which are placed in concentric circles around the ethnonational core (Triantafyllidou & Veikou 2002).

A.2. The public discourse on immigration and related issues

Immigration policies for non-Greek immigrants came post hoc enforcing their exclusion from a multitude of social, political, and economic domains thus far adopting a differential exclusion model (see Castles 1995). The Greek state expects *allogenis* immigrants to conceal their difference and "behave like Greeks" and at the same time prevents them from being "Greeks" (Christopoulos 2004:362). Twenty years after the beginning of mass immigration this problematic policy approach cannot be attributed solely to the newness of the phenomenon. Moreover, the restrictive policy cannot be considered as a reaction to lean times resulting from the economic pressures imposed on the Greek welfare state, which is in a crisis. Actually, migration policy can be analysed as a tool developed to confront the crisis through the high fees that immigrants are obliged to pay for their residence permits. Influence and pressures at the EU level played a crucial role for policies on strict border control. Yet, the EU policy proposal for the integration of the ethnic minority populations already present had a marginal effect on the design of the Greek policy. As rightly put by Cavounides (2006: 376), immigration policy in Greece treats the presence of a significant migrant population as a temporary phenomenon that can be reversed when desired or that a constant turnover of the migrant stock can be achieved.

Thus far, ethno-national considerations and ideologies of Greekness have been of crucial importance. On the one hand, the presence of a significant *allogenis* immigrant population was consistently treated as a temporary phenomenon, rather than a permanent feature of the contemporary Greek state. On the other hand, favourable policies encouraged the return of Soviet Greeks. This differentiated policy approach is closely linked to the nation's self-perception as a homogenous Greek Orthodox entity, based on the founding myth of the nation-state which sees continuity from ancient times to the present, passing through the Byzantine era. According to this perception, only immigrants of Greek descent may be an important resource for the country, in contrast to *allogenis* immigrants who are viewed as a threat to both social cohesion and cultural homogeneity of the nation (Pratsinakis 2008).

The hierarchy of Greekness (Triantafyllidou & Veikou 2002) which underlies immigration policy is constructed is also projected in media discourse. According to Pavlou (2001) there is a clear distinction in immigrant group representations in the media, where Soviet Greek "returnees" and Albanian immigrants comprise two poles, the former being positively represented while the latter negatively stereotyped. In general, the media have played a leading role in picturing immigration as a threat for the cultural homogeneity of the nation, while together with the police-logic of the exclusionary legal framework (especially during the 1990s) they contributed to the construction and reproduction of the "criminal migrant" stereotype, particularly for Albanians (Karides 1995; Lazarides 1996; Droukas 1998)¹⁰. To a significant extent, negative reporting on immigrants is also couched in conspiracy theories and rhetoric and an overall perception of cultural threat. A study by Triantafyllidou and Veikou (2002) focusing on media reporting on immigration and minority issues distinguishes between two main categories: a large part of daily press and television channels adopting a xenophobic standpoint and a few dissenting voices which adopt a more careful and sensitive approach when reporting on ethnic issues and immigration matters. There is however an evident lack of recent studies that look in to the dynamics of this process and how it has evolved as well as the representations in different media (national-local, digital-TV -Press)¹¹. A recent paper by Triantafyllidou (2007) reports a modest positive change¹².

A.3. Local Policy

Like in other domains of policy making in Greece, the framework of immigration policy is managed at the national level and depends directly on ministries or ministerial bodies. The framework is therefore highly centralised in that it does not allow for much autonomy at regional or local levels, apart from what may be exercised by individual public officers in specific branches or departments. From an organisational point of view, however, procedures are broken down at various territorial administrative levels. For instance: regional authorities are responsible for the issue and renewal of residence permits; work permits are administered by the employment departments of prefectural authorities; and citizenship applications are submitted to municipal authorities. Licences for trade and various types of businesses are also administered at a local municipal level, while welfare services provided by Municipalities are open to all residents. Similarly, universal provision of education, healthcare and welfare services are embedded on broader (governmental) institutional

¹⁰ State TV channels have consciously changed their language since 1998, eliminating overtly racist and discriminatory terms when referring to immigrants., while the National Council for TV and Radio has suggested that journalists should omit reference to nationality when an individual is arrested (Triantafyllidou 2002).

¹¹ This may also reveal more nuanced findings on the way Greek and non Greek immigrants are represented.

¹² This positive coverage concerns mainly the improvement of their living or working conditions, their access to education or work, but not their politicisation as non-Greek cultural or ethnic groups that comprise a part of Greece. Small television stations such as *Kanali 10* provide news updates in Russian and Albanian and certain radio stations in the Attica prefecture cater to immigrant communities (such as national broadcasting ERA, or Radio 98.4, etc).

structures but managed at a local level and are formally accessible by migrants with legal status.

Nevertheless certain Municipalities seem to have taken a more active role in taking care of issues relating to the growing presence of immigrants, which reflects of course not only the demographics of each district but also the representation and relative influence of political forces in local Councils. A glance at local authorities' websites is revealing in that respect. A sharp contrast emerges, for example, if one compares the Municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki in their approaches towards the presence and needs of immigrants. Athens, under conservative rule, appears to move towards a "multicultural" model of governance which is not simply evident in rhetorical terms but involves a set of measures of social policy provision at a local level, including education (e.g. through language classes), childcare (through "intercultural kindergartens") and various support and information services in areas as varied as female employment, homelessness or unemployment (www.cityofathens.gr). By contrast, in Thessaloniki, long-governed by the same (conservative) party, references to migrants in Municipal web-pages are almost absent (www.thessalonikicity.gr).

A growing trend since the mid-2000s has been the establishment of "Aliens" Departments or Offices within Municipal structures, offering information and assistance over residence permit applications (which they receive and process to regional authorities), keeping records and statistics, and dealing with a number of issues relating to the implementation of and information about national immigration policy at a local level. The municipalities of Ambelokipoi, Stavroupoli, Kalithea, Oreokastro, Thermaikos, for example, have evidently established such bodies which often cover immigrant residents of neighbouring districts. Some districts have established similar structures dealing exclusively with Soviet Greeks (Neapoli, Stavroupoli). On the other hand, the social policy departments of various Councils address the needs of migrants either by referring to those groups explicitly or indirectly by including them among the category of "vulnerable social groups" (e.g. Ambelokipoi, Kalamaria, Neapoli, Thermi, Mikra). At least two Municipalities (Ambelokipoi, Polihni) have been recently operating Medical Centres ("*polyiatreia*") which offer basic primary healthcare services to people without formal access to the national health system, including uninsured immigrants. In some cases, such social policy interventions may be specific to local issues, like for instance the regeneration and social programmes at one of the largest Roma settlements in the country (Dendropotamos) which falls in the territory of the Municipality of Menemeni in western Thessaloniki. Finally, the central Municipality in Thessaloniki, in collaboration with prefectural authorities, hosts a reception centre for refugees and asylum seekers operated by an NGO, located right at the heart of the city.

Part B - Political and administrative structure of the city

B.1. The territorial basis of the administrative structure of the city

Greater Thessaloniki is the second largest urban conglomeration in Greece after Athens. The Thessaloniki Prefecture (Nomarhia) is located at the heart of the region of Central Macedonia, which altogether includes another 6 prefectures. Map B1 locates Thessaloniki Prefecture within Greece.

Map B1: Greece-Thessaloniki Prefecture




During the last Census of March 2001, the Prefecture had a population of nearly 1.1 million, concentrating about one tenth of the national and 56.5% of the regional population. The Thessaloniki Prefecture is divided administratively in two departments, Thessaloniki and Langada, and 45 Municipalities. Of these, 31 belong to the Thessaloniki Department, or Greater Thessaloniki Area (GTA), spread across nearly 80 different settlements which are inhabited by slightly less than one million people, i.e. the vast majority of the Prefecture's population. The GTA is of particular importance, in political, economic and developmental terms, which goes beyond the prefecture's and region's boundaries, as it concerns the whole northern part of Greece, while its transnational role in the wider Balkan area has been widening in the last 15 years or so. Map B2 illustrates the GTA's main geographical units as described in this report, while Table B1 numbers the Municipalities corresponding to the Map, indicating the spatial units in which they belong as well as their respective population in 2001.

Within the GTA, the city of Thessaloniki constitutes the centre of the urban system of northern Greece and influences directly or indirectly other urban centres in the area at a regional or prefecture level. The city of Thessaloniki or Thessaloniki Conurbation (CON) geographically spreads along the coast of Thermaikos Gulf, and consists administratively of 16 municipalities and communes, concentrating more than 80% of the GTA's population. Nearly half of its residents live in the central Municipality of Thessaloniki itself, the largest of the Conurbation's municipalities, located at the heart of the Conglomeration. Other large municipalities of the Conurbation are: Kalamaria, bordering Thessaloniki to the south-east, with about 90,000 inhabitants; Evosmos to the north-west (55,000); Ambelokipoi, Stavroupoli and Sykies, again northwest of the Municipality (about 43,000 each); Polihni (37,500) and Neapoli, also to the north-west (nearly 32,000). The smallest Municipalities are Triandria and Agios Pavlos, bordering Thessaloniki to the north, with about 11,200 and 8000 residents respectively, and those of Pefka and Efkarpia (with approximately 6,500 inhabitants each). The five GTA Municipalities surrounding the Conurbation, three to the northwest and two to the south-east, form the Peri-Urban Zone (PUZ) - currently areas of rapid suburbanisation. The remaining 10 GTA Municipalities, with an average population of about 11,000 each, form mostly the rural part of the conglomeration, with the exception of the rising south-eastern sea-side suburbs of Thermaikos, Mihaniona and Mikra. Table B1 illustrates in detail the Prefecture's population by administrative unit, as well as its distribution across the various municipalities.

Regional administration is organised at two levels: at the region level, the administrative unit is the Region of Central Macedonia; at the Prefecture level, the administrative unit is the Thessaloniki Prefecture, which includes the sub-unit of the Department of Thessaloniki. Local administration is organised at a municipal level. Even for the city of Thessaloniki itself (the Conurbation), there is not an administrative unit coordinating the different municipalities that constitute the urban core. The Thessaloniki Administrative Plan (Rythmistiko Shedio), whose boundaries coincide with the GTA, is the city's planning authority but it is not a political territorial unit. Thus, although Greater Thessaloniki is referred to as a metropolitan area, there are no metropolitan administrative structures. In fact, there is an ongoing discussion, research and planning on the necessity for and potential of metropolitan governance in Thessaloniki (Kafkalas, *et al.*, 2002).

Map B2: Greater Thessaloniki's administrative units



Accordingly, three possible scenarios have been so far examined regarding the establishment of metropolitan administrative and political structures. The first (expanded) scenario assumes that the territorial basis of the metropolis should be defined by all areas forming a unified spatial-functional system; accordingly, the metropolitan area should include the whole of the Prefecture as well as parts of neighbouring prefectures. The second (condensed) scenario is based on the criterion of urban cohesion and suggests that the metropolitan boundaries coincide with those of the GTA. The third (middle-level) scenario takes into account the existing administrative structures and proposes the Prefecture itself as the territorial unit of metropolitan administration. The discussion that follows does not take into account the first of the above scenarios, but refers interchangeably to the Prefecture and the GTA as the metropolis, while some of the discussion concerns the urban core, i.e. the Thessaloniki Conurbation. However, the spatial unit on which we based our statistical analysis is Greater Thessaloniki, following the criterion of urban cohesion.

B.2. Available statistics, methods and sources

The statistical data presented here were collected through the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG, www.statistics.gr). Unless otherwise stated, our analysis has been based primarily on information available from the “Population and Housing Census” conducted in March 2001, while data provided by the “National Centre for Social Research” (www.ekke.gr/english) were also employed for the performed analysis¹³. The 2001 Census is believed to have recorded the immigrant population with a degree of relative accuracy. In some cases, the discussion refers to additional NSSG data which are available online, such as the 2000 Housing Census, Labour Force Surveys and National Accounts (various years), or even data from other sources, e.g. central government, regional authorities, insurance funds, or governmental bodies. The use of alternative sources is made explicitly clear in the relevant sections of the report.

These 2001 Census data we have used in the analysis involve variables concerning the demographic, socio-economic and housing characteristics of the population in Thessaloniki Prefecture, including data on migration based on criteria of nationality and origin. More specifically, our analysis has looked at 19 variables related to the general structure of the geographical units, namely the 31 Municipalities of the Greater Thessaloniki Area (GTA), and the relevant spatial sub-groupings, i.e. the Thessaloniki Conurbation, the Peri-Urban Zone and the remaining outer municipalities of the GTA. These variables can be categorised in four different groups: demographic structure, socioeconomic profile, ethnic structure and housing conditions. Each group contained an uneven number of variables, as shown in the C4 in Part C (section C.3.1).

The employed classification criteria refer to nationality and in one case country of origin, in order to identify the most significant migratory groups in the city of Thessaloniki. This classification resulted in the formation of five major groups of migrants: a) ‘Soviet Greeks’ (referring to Greek citizens who were born in countries of the former Soviet Union), b) Albanians, c) migrants from the EU and other ‘western’ origins, d) migrants from the former Soviet Union and e) migrants from other origins (‘others’).

An emerging methodological issue concerns the first group, namely Soviet Greeks literary referred to by the authorities as *palinnotoundes homogoneis*, which translates to “repatriating ethnic Greeks”. According to official statistics, the term “immigrants” refers to foreign nationals only. This however does not include the majority of approximately 180.000 Soviet Greeks who settled to Greece since 1989 and have been able to acquire Greek nationality by means of a summary mode of acquisition due to their Greek descent. Consequently, those who had naturalised by 2001, constituting the great majority, disappear from the immigration statistics as recorded by the 2001 Census. At the same time the Census significantly under-recorded the population of “repatriating ethnic Greeks” (only 10,971 migrants in Thessaloniki).

Katsavounidou and Kourti (2006) made a first attempt to include Soviet Greeks in the city’s immigrant population. They combined the 2001 Census statistics based on nationality and data on Soviet Greeks published by the General Secretariat of Repatriating Ethnic Greeks for 2000. This calculation however, overestimates the total immigrant population since it double-counts those Soviet Greeks who had not naturalised. Most importantly, this second dataset is not that accurate since it did not count the real population of Soviet Greeks but results from a survey completed in three different stages (1997, 1999, 2000). Accordingly, the Soviet Greek population in the GTA appears to be 43.500, which is identical to the total population of those born in the former Soviet Union, both Greek and foreign nationals, as counted by the 2001

¹³ We are grateful to both the National Statistical Service of Greece and the National Centre for Social Research for the provision of the data used in this report. We would like to thank especially our colleagues at the National Institute of Social Research for their kind assistance with the elaboration of the 2001 Census data.

Census. Therefore if we combine those datasets we risk in asserting that in 2001 there were no migrants of non-Greek descent from the former USSR (Georgians, Russians, Armenians, etc.) living in the city. Since this is incontestably not true, the Soviet Greek population at the time of the Census must have been significantly smaller. Therefore our analysis included the estimation of the number of 'homogeneis' as Greek citizens born in countries of the former Soviet Union. Indeed this methodology underestimates the total Soviet Greek population as it does not include those who had not naturalised by March 2001 as well as their children born in Greece. Yet, it provides a much more reliable picture for this report, compared to that offered by the NSSG or the General Secretariat Censuses, and renders this special group statistically comparable to the rest of the (foreign) migrant population.

The second emerging issue is involved with the geographical units to which data were available. Specifically, these data were collected on the basis of Census Tracts, which constitute the smaller territorial units employed in the Census aiming to identify migratory areas of the smaller possible size. The GTA comprises of 980 Census Tracts, with an average population of about 1,000; the largest one has 11,000 residence and lies within the Municipality of Thessaloniki, while the smallest one had only seven inhabitants. However, cartographic representations of these units were not available (lacking a digital cartographic base), resulting in the decision to estimate and present the variables on the level of Municipality. Thus, our factorial and cluster analysis (Parts C, D and E) includes a Municipality with a population of more than 360,000 (Thessaloniki) and another one of 6,000 (Kallithea), a fact that hindered our efforts to capture the dynamics at the smallest possible territorial scale and to locate the socio-economic and demographic characteristics, including the presence of immigrants, within concrete neighbourhoods. Still, however the analysis presented here generated very interesting results that make perfect sense in socio-spatial terms. On the other hand, the possibility of using the rich information available at Census Tract level at a later stage of the GEITONIES project is not entirely ruled out in respect to the detailed neighbourhood analyses that will follow. On the other hand, additional aspects of the analysis and discussion have been indeed based on consideration of results at the Census Tract level, as for example in the case of calculating segregation indices (see Part D).

Table B1: Thessaloniki's population by municipality, 2001

TERRITORIAL UNITS/ MUNICIPALITIES		POPULATION	TERRITORIAL UNITS/ MUNICIPALITIES		POPULATION
PREFECTURE TOTAL		1057825			
Map Label	GREATER THESSALONIKI AREA (GTA)	981933	Map Label		
	CONURBATION (CON)	800764		PERI-URBAN ZONE (PUZ)	71328
1	THESSALONIKI	363987	17	EHEDOROS	23924
2	AGIOS PAVLOS	7978	18	THERMI	16546
3	AMBELOKIPOI	40959	19	KALLITHEA	6096
4	ELEFThERIO-KORDELIO	21630	20	HORTIATIS	12866
5	EVOSMOS	52624	21	OREOKASTRO	11896
6	KALAMARIA	87255		remaining GTA	109841
7	MENEMENI	14910	22	AGIOS ATHANASIOS	14387
8	NEAPOLI	30279	23	AXIOS	6780
9	PANORAMA	14552	24	VASILIKA	9303
10	POLIHNI	36146	25	EPANOMI	8671
11	PYLAIA	22744	26	THERMAIKOS	20253
12	STAVROUPOLI	41653	27	KOUFALIA	10757
13	SYKIES	41726	28	MIHANIONA	9425
14	TRIANDRIA	11289	29	MIKRA	10427
15	EFKARPIA commune	6598	30	HALASTRA	9837
16	PEFKA commune	6434	31	HALKIDONA	10001

Part C - Social territorial description of the city

C.1. Thessaloniki's productive and employment structures

Greater Thessaloniki is the major economic centre in northern Greece, and the second one in Greece, producing about 11.7 percent of the total national GDP and nearly 67 percent of the regional GDP in Central Macedonia in 2002, and concentrating 8% of the country's labour force in 2003¹⁴. In the same year, the GDP per capita in the Prefecture was higher than the national average by 18 percentage points.

Greater Thessaloniki may be described as an 'urban-industrial' labour market where traditional, informal, labour-intensive activities coexist with modern, formal and capital-intensive ones (Vaiou and Hadjimichalis 1997: Table 4.9). It comprises skilled, 'central' and unionised labour employed in industries and services of both the private and the public sectors, seasonal employment in small- and medium-scale enterprises and in intensive agriculture, 'female' employment in sectors of diffused industrialisation, and informal employment in construction, trade and various services. In 2001, the majority of the labour force was employed in manufacturing, trade and especially various types of services (Table C1). The trend, however, has been towards the ongoing shrinking of manufacturing and primary sector employment, with a parallel growth of work in construction, trade, finance, real estate and health and education services, as shown in the Table below.

Table C1: Labour Force by Sex and Sector of Employment, 1991-2001 (Prefecture)

	Census 1991			Census 2001		
	total	men	women	total	men	women
Total Labour Force	372,652	64.8	35.2	457,138	60.6	39.4
agriculture	6.0	7.1	4.0	4.8	4.8	4.9
manufacturing, mining & energy	23.9	22.4	26.7	18.4	19.4	16.8
construction	6.2	9.5	0.2	7.4	11.7	0.9
trade & repair	16.9	17.8	15.2	17	17.4	16.3
hotels & restaurants	3.3	3.6	2.8	5.4	5.2	5.8
transport, storage & communications	5.8	8.1	1.6	5.9	8.1	2.3
financial organisations & real estate	6.1	5.3	7.5	8.8	7.1	11.4
public administration, defence & social security	5.9	6.3	5	5.1	5.7	4.3
education services, health & welfare	10.5	6.6	17.4	11.7	7.2	18.8
other services	3.5	2.9	4.6	4.9	3.2	7.5
young & unclassified	12	10.4	14.9	10.5	10.3	10.9

Source: NSSG, Censuses 1991 and 2001, various tables

Thessaloniki's productive structure has been undergoing important changes, and is characterised by a heavy reliance on services with a significant - though declining - industrial sector. During 1994–1995, manufacturing accounted for 25.9 percent of production and services for 70.5 percent. Manufacturing concerns about one third of the total number of companies in Thessaloniki Prefecture (ICAP 2003), making the area the second most important industrial complex in the country after Athens. In 2000, 16.3 percent of Greece's manufacturers and 13.9 percent of industrial employment were concentrated in the prefecture. The principal industries until the end of the 1990s were shoes and clothing, textiles, tobacco, food and beverages, transportation means, furniture and metal machinery.

¹⁴ Data are obtained from the NSSG's website (www.statistics.gr), more specifically from National Accounts (regional data 2002) and Labour Force Surveys (2003).

Chronaki et al. (1993) report that a significant part of industrial activity remains unrecorded, especially for smaller enterprises, often family-owned and family-run, which also tend to apply labour-intensive practices. As in the rest of Greece, small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) constitute the main type of company unit, with an average size of 6.5 employees in the mid-1990s (Kafkalas et al. 1996: 55). The tertiary sector, where especially SMEs prevail, is of particular importance for Thessaloniki's economy. Commercial activities have been historically the cornerstone of the city's economic life (Moskov 1978). Trade alone accounted for about 60 percent of services in 2001 (ICAP 2003: Figure 2).

From the late 1980s, the rise in labour costs and the rigidities of the Greek labour market, increasing international competition and the inability of SMEs to modernise interrupted the fragile dynamism of the previous decades and resulted in crisis (Chronaki et al. 1993; Vaiou & Hadjimichalis 1997). The 1990s witnessed many enterprises shutting down or moving abroad and a rapid growth in unemployment. The overall improved performance of the Greek economy during the second half of the 1990s (reaching EU standards and entering the monetary union), combined with certain aspects of restructuring processes, may have had some positive impact on the local economy. A new dynamism, for instance, may be implied by trends of neo-industrialisation resulting in the emergence of an internationally competitive industrial complex in the area, with direct links to Greek Foreign Direct Investment in the Balkans (Komninos & Sefertzi 1998). The urban economy itself is currently undergoing trends of further tertiarisation and informationalisation, with the development of larger companies based on capital-intensive methods (Giannakou & Kafkalas 1999). Personal consumption increased significantly in the city over the past three decades, and is currently characterised by two major trends (Giannakou & Kafkalas 1999): (i) the persistence of massive demand for 'Fordist-type' products and services, and (ii) the shift towards more individualised forms of demand. The pervasive effects of ongoing economic restructuring, however, in the advent of the global financial crisis, are yet still unfolding and this suggests a degree of uncertainty over future developments.


Industrial production is mainly located in two main areas/complexes: Sindos (in Ehedoros Municipality) to the west, with a more "traditional" manufacturing base, and Thermi to the east, concentrating the more dynamic and capital-intensive activities. Yet, production is considerably diffused and small manufacturing units can be found all over the city (Chronaki et al. 1993). Commercial activities are even more dispersed, although inner-city neighbourhoods are generally characterised by small retail trade while large commercial outlets tend to concentrate mostly on the outskirts. Similarly, the spatial distribution of other service activities (leisure, finance, public services, etc.) is generally marked by an over-representation in the city centre, followed by the central areas of various districts/municipalities and, depending on the type of activity, certain concentrations in suburban locations – while the city centre itself concentrates a diverse range of activities.

C.2. The urban population: social characteristics and housing

In general, the population in the Thessaloniki Prefecture and particularly in the Conurbation has increased relatively slow during the last 20 years. Map C1 illustrates population change in the Prefecture by Municipality in the last two Censuses, while proportionate change at the different spatial levels is shown in the first line of Table C1. In fact, in the central Municipality of Thessaloniki, as well as and in two other inner city districts (Triandria, Menemeni) and particularly in various municipalities of the Langadas Department, population has been actually decreasing. It is the Peri-Urban Zone that has experienced the most rapid population growth over this period, as well as the outer Conurbation municipalities, and most of the outer GTA, which have seen their population rapidly growing, especially those in the southeast. These trends reveal ongoing rural-to-urban movements in the Prefecture as a

whole, with recent processes of suburbanisation taking place in parallel. Such trends are to an extent reflected on the age structure of the population in Greater Thessaloniki. Although there are no significant variations in age patterns across Greater Thessaloniki, with about 71% of the population at working age, the central Municipalities appear to host relatively older residents, while the Peri-Urban Zone is home to a significantly younger population (see Table C1).

Map C1: Population change by Municipality in the Prefecture of Thessaloniki, 1991-2001



Expectedly, the distribution of the population's activity rates follows a similar pattern: with an average of about 60%, they slightly drop in the inner city. Unemployment in the Prefecture was exceeding 11% in 2001, with the Conurbation municipalities, particularly those in the north-west, exhibiting the highest rates. In fact, the unemployment rate overall grew throughout the 1990s, from 8.2% at the beginning of the decade (1991 Census), to a pick of 13.4 percent in 1999, and has since dropped (at 10% in early 2003; data from NSSG's Labour Force Surveys). Unemployment is higher among women, rising to more than 14%, and the younger employees in general (people between 15–39 years old), among whom it approaches 17%. Notably, this is the better-educated section of the labour force, with 40% possessing a university degree (and the rate is higher for women in this group). High shares of part-time employment are also observed among this age group. In terms of education, one in five GTA residents hold a university degree, significantly more since 1991, especially in the case of women, while 12.4% have not completed primary education. Following the geography of Thessaloniki's productive and employment patterns, most graduates live in the inner city, while the shares of those with a lower education level rise considerably in the rural outer municipalities.

Among those employed, the proportion of waged employees – nearly 70% - exceeds significantly the national rate and has grown since 1991. The share of employers has also increased at 14.3%, while self-employment dropped dramatically to 13.2%. The higher

shares of employers are found mostly in the trade sector, but also in manufacturing and the hotel and catering industry, while the self-employed are concentrated in agriculture, trade and real-estate services. Again, the geographical patterns are to be attributed to the geography of economic activity across the city. Among waged employees, for example, those working in low-skilled or unskilled positions (including petit entrepreneurs) form a share of about 30% in the GTA, but live in higher concentrations in the Conurbation, especially north-western districts, and constitute about 40% of the employees residing in the Municipality of Thessaloniki itself.

Table C2: Thessaloniki's population: key demographic and social characteristics

		GTA	CON	THES	PUZ	remaining GTA
TOTAL POPULATION		981,933	800,764	363,987	71,328	109,841
population change 1991-2001		11.93	6.90	-5.20	55.80	33.29
age	<15	15.6	15.1	12.5	18.9	16.7
	15-64	70.7	71.0	71.0	70.0	68.7
	65+	13.8	13.9	16.6	11.1	14.6
	activity rate	61.5	61.2	59.5	62.8	62.4
households	% single parents	7.7	8.3	9.0	5.5	5.3
education	illiterate	12.4	11.5	9.5	13.1	17.2
	higher education	18.9	19.9	23.6	15.0	12.7
employment	employers	14.3	12.7	12.0	16.3	13.2
	self-employed	13.2	10.8	11.3	13.6	20.0
	assistants in family business	2.7	1.6	0.9	5.7	7.0
	workers in low skilled jobs	30.2	30.0	38.0	30.4	31.4
	unemployed	11.5	11.7	11.1	10.0	10.8
housing	owners	70.1	69.5	62.5	76.2	81.7
	tenants	23.5	24.1	30.5	16.0	11.9
	living space <15 m ²	10.6	10.3	9.7	11.5	12.6
	living space >40 m ²	19.5	19.2	22.8	22.3	19.7

As in the rest of Greece, home ownership in Greater Thessaloniki is widespread. The inner municipalities, particularly the city-centre itself, concentrate the highest proportion of tenants (Table C1), as they hosts more people looking for relatively temporary residence. The high shares of home-ownership became possible in the course of urban development in the decades following the second world war, particularly the 1960s and 1970s, when rapid urbanisation (involving a relatively large degree of informal settlement) and booming construction passed through the mechanism of 'antiparochy' (to exchange one's house for one or more flats in a newly-built block), often mediated through strong family ties and clientalist relations between citizens and politicians. This partly explains the considerably low levels of social housing.

Table C3: Thessaloniki's housing stock, by period of construction

	GTA	CON	THES	PUZ	remaining GTA
TOTAL	150,068	79,674	23,563	23,648	46,746
before 1945	4	4.3	10.9	3	3.8
1946 to 1960	12.3	13.1	13.1	11.3	11.4
1961 to 1980	42.5	46.7	50	30	41.7
1981 to 1995	30.6	26.3	20.7	39.1	33.8
1996 and later	8.6	8.2	4.3	13.4	7
under construction	1.5	1.1	0.7	2.5	1.7

Source: NSSG, Housing Census 2000

As shown in table C2, the big bulk of the city's housing stock was built during the 1960s and 1970s, and buildings constructed between 1946-1985 constitute nearly two thirds of the total. Studies of the city's housing market explained the subsequent crisis, unfolding since the 1970s, with growing shortage of housing and sharp rises in prices and rents since the early 1990s (e.g. Velentzas *et al.* 1996), particularly in the centre and the popular eastern districts and suburbs. This trend has continued throughout the 1990s, but its parameters changed dramatically towards the end of the decade, giving way to a rise in construction activity. Just before a new crisis reflecting the global financial turmoil as well as domestic troubles, Greater Thessaloniki's housing market has been driven by an increase in demand partly related to an overall growth in consumption and more specifically to flexibilisation in loans and mortgages, as well as to high levels of speculation.

C.3. Social characterisation of spatial units in the city

As the city geographically spreads along the coast, its social map is divided between the prosperous, more expensive and better-conserved areas of the south-east and the poorer and cheaper areas at the north-west, Thessaloniki Municipality lies at the heart of the conglomeration and is highly diverse and socially mixed, though exhibits a similar East-West geographical pattern of social differentiation on urban space. There exist relatively "downgraded" neighbourhoods within the Thessaloniki Municipality and in eastern Thessaloniki, but by no means can they be characterised as "clusters of poverty", while there are also "nice" areas in the north-west. In general though, north-western districts are overall less wealthy and some of them concentrate social groups living in relatively 'vulnerable' conditions in significant numbers: migrants, Roma, single parent families, unemployed, etc. (Tsoulouvis 1996). Unemployment rates for instance exceeded 12 per cent in most north-western areas during the Census. However, even in such neighbourhoods the population remains ethnically and socially mixed.

As we are going to see, the spatial patterns of migrants' residence depend on the housing market (primarily rents, and to a lesser extent property prices), as well as work availability and workplace location or the migrants' social networks, but have not so far resulted in immigrants clustering within 'problematic' areas, with only a couple of possible exceptions concerning mostly Soviet Greeks in outer Conurbation districts. This may to an extent reflect historical patterns of urban development, as north-western districts have resulted from "anarchic" urbanisation of the previous decades, while construction patterns in the eastern parts of the city have generally followed a more planned path (see Leontidou 1990). Generally speaking, however, social divisions in Thessaloniki are not that sharp, partly due to the existence of a wide middle class dispersed across the city, and partly to the relative diffusion of economic activities (Leontidou 1990: ch. 5; Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: ch. 7). Instead of an horizontal social differentiation the case in Thessaloniki seems to confirm Leontidou's (1990; 1996) thesis about vertical residential divisions, i.e. the wealthier segments of the population living on the upper floors (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001: ch.7. This is particularly true for the inner city and surrounding districts, especially to the north-west, which are generally marked by high population density, more compact urban structure and older housing stock. The key urban trends that have been observed mostly regarding the case of Athens are evident here as well (Leontidou 1990; Vaiou 2002; Maloutas 2003; 2004; Kotzamanis 2005): speculation in the housing market; suburbanisation of the middle classes; increasing homogenisation of the urban space with clusters of wealth and poverty speckled across the city. Again, some of this will become evident in the maps to follow.

The statistical analysis below explores the issues briefly discussed here using 2001 Census data, namely the overall pattern of east-west social divisions and the city's relative social mix, while it also locates the position of the migrants within Thessaloniki's urban social

geography. The factor analysis presented in the next section interestingly confirms the above patterns and sketches an explanatory framework which offers a useful interpretative background for our discussion of the city's ethnic geography in the following chapter (Part D). The results have been mapped in order to visually represent the social profile of spatial units in the city, but also in order to proceed with our cluster analysis that has allowed us to understand these spatial units as relatively similar or homogeneous groups.

C.3.1. Factor analysis

We have used 19 variables related to general population characteristics, which have been categorised in four different groups: demographic structure, socioeconomic profile, ethnic structure and housing conditions. Each group contains an uneven number of variables, as shown in Table C4 below. The analysis was carried out at our 31 spatial units, namely the 29 Municipalities and 2 Communes constituting the Greater Thessaloniki Area (in 2001 – since then the Communes have become Municipalities). The data were entered into SPSS.15 which was used in order to run a factor analysis, aiming at reducing the overall number of variables at few meaningful explanatory factors that could be constructively interpreted in the light of the literature, additional data and our knowledge about the city.

Table C4: Variables used in Factor and Cluster analysis

GROUP		VARIABLES	EXPLANATION
Demographic structure	1	Age_15	Population aged less than 15 years
	2	Age_65	Population aged over 65 years
	3	Single Parents	Single parents among total population
Socioeconomic profile	4	Active	Economically active population
	5	Unemployed	Unemployed population
	6	Unskilled	Unskilled workers
	7	High skilled	High skilled workers
	8	Illiterate	Population who has not received primary education
	9	Higher Education	Population with a higher education degree
	10	Employers	Employers
Ethnic Structure	11	Soviet Greeks	Migrants of Greek origin from the former USSR
	12	Albanians	Albanian migrants
	13	Westerners	Migrants from EU countries and other western origins
	14	Soviet Union	Migrants from the former Soviet Union
	15	Other migrants	Migrants from other origins
Housing Conditions	16	Owners	People who own their house
	17	Less_15sqm	People living in less than 15 square meters
	18	No Heating	People living in a property with no central heating
	19	Housing_after1996	Housing stock built after 1996

Correlations between variables were at a first place useful in order to identify relationships, their strength and direction, sketching potential patterns which may be interesting for subsequent investigation. Apart from a number of rather obvious relationships, such as between variables indicating social privilege or social disadvantage¹⁵, there are statistically meaningful results concerning the migrant groups under consideration, which are also sociologically interesting either by confirming existing knowledge or by revealing hidden characteristics. So, for instance, migrants in general appear to be mostly of working age, but single parenthood seems to be more common among immigrants from the former Soviet

¹⁵ E.g. the highly educated are positively correlated to those in highly skilled professions, employers or home owners, while the unemployed for instance are positively correlated to single-parenthood, unskilled jobs or small housing space.

Union. Overall, a clear social divide between different migrant groups can be observed, but unexpectedly. Pearson correlation scores for unemployment and unskilled workers exceed 0.6 for migrants from the former USSR, both of ethnic Greek and “foreign” origin. On the other hand nationals of EU and other Western countries are positively correlated with high education levels, highly skilled positions, or homeownership and are more likely to be employers. Interestingly, or diverse “other migrants” category is correlated positively to indicators of social privilege and negatively to those of social disadvantage. Albanian migrants, finally, do not exhibit particularly high correlation scores with any of the variables, apart from that indicating a small housing space (less than 15 square metres) possibly revealing of situations of home-sharing or overcrowding housing conditions.

The analysis identified four factors, which are presented in the next Table. Variable scores considered more likely to define the factors are marked in bold. It is obvious that certain variables are grouped together under these four factors and account for the explanatory power of each factor.

Table C5: Factor analysis scores

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Age_15	-0,078662195	-0,005994639	0,93701522	0,030344439
Age_65	-0,19021032	-0,302134402	-0,863801263	0,146744517
Single Parents	0,131597398	0,85085508	-0,3520286	-0,160747442
Active	0,140923127	0,063117438	0,629526068	-0,256774417
Unemployed	-0,534463059	0,690426095	-0,018776254	-0,150536807
Unskilled	-0,606333023	0,535515173	0,149554625	0,297049954
High Skilled	0,850096718	-0,242807476	0,312569394	-0,27813291
Illiterate	-0,865103928	-0,230296276	-0,115144692	0,075369584
Higher Education	0,894608077	-0,082957083	0,250047191	-0,286004963
Employers	0,656363301	-0,272246898	0,515419	-0,210340833
Soviet Greeks	-0,377095712	0,638372292	0,380019886	0,024870042
Albanians	-0,305804626	-0,163967983	-0,076821002	0,861792299
Westerners	0,865867423	-0,072012732	0,020592171	-0,100595439
Soviet Union	-0,070262807	0,859472999	0,122476521	0,216834677
Other migrants	0,789164916	0,205932671	-0,07149479	0,253745038
Owners	-0,292963513	-0,875751934	-0,000378717	-0,165955545
Less_15sqm	-0,459556422	0,342177351	-0,20612784	0,521031299
No Heating	0,15833268	0,347124369	-0,345473821	0,687668521
Housing_after1996	0,314407703	-0,375315461	0,753779133	-0,091044441

Table C6 groups variables under each of the factors which they mostly define, and accordingly names each of those factors offering also a description of the respective results. It also lists the explanatory power of each factor, although one needs to bear in mind that what is explained statistically does not necessarily account for sociological interpretations too. By this we mean that the first two factors make perfect sense in their *interpretative* value as in the share of the total variance they explain in statistical terms. We would not anticipate significant changes in case our list of variables was different or larger. The latter two factors, however, offer a rather descriptive account grouping together a number of variables in way that does make sense, but without actually having much explanatory power as such, as they would such results would likely differ having had included different indicators - particularly with respect to the variables relating to immigrants in the city. This assertion will become clearer in our discussion in the following sections of the report. More specifically:

- Factor 1, which we understand as a *socioeconomic* one, explains 28% of the total variance. It basically groups together variables relating related to social class (education level, position in employment, skill-quality of jobs) by mostly depicting conditions of social privilege, hence our description of the result. The “ethnic”

dimension of this factor is rather obvious in the case of western-country immigrants, although not as much regarding the remaining “Other” migrant groups, confirming however our earlier speculation on the correlation matrix.

- Factor 3 explains 21.8% of the total and is also a socioeconomic one in its essence. To distinguish it though from the first one and also to better describe the nature of the variables defining it, we labelled it as a *household characteristics* factor. In a sense, it shows a situation opposite to that captured by the first factor, by referring mostly to conditions of social disadvantage such as unemployment, single parenthood or low levels of home ownership – hence our description “socially unlucky”. The migrant groups scoring high under this factor are ethnic Greeks and foreign migrants from the former Soviet Union, again confirming our earlier assumption.
- Factor 3 has an almost similar explanatory share of 18.5%, and we titled it *demographic* as it mostly comprises of variables relating to the age structure of the population. It does not involve any particular immigrant group. Our description of the result intends to capture this emerging relationship between younger sections of the populations and their propensity to live in newer properties. This factor is merely descriptive though perhaps indicative of trends of population change in the city.
- Lastly, Factor 4 is based mostly on *housing conditions*, depicting basically lower quality as indicated by the lack of central heating and the small housing space. The description of the factor as “freezing Albanians...” aims intends to capture the likelihood of Albanian immigrants living in relatively harsher housing conditions. Apart from being basically descriptive, this factor also explains a lesser share of the total variance (just 11%), although it may suggest the relative weight of Albanians as a large section of the migrant population on the city’s housing market.

Table C6: Factor analysis results

FACTORS	VARIABLES	RESULTS		DESCRIPTION
		Rotation sums of squared loadings		
		total	% of variance	
Factor 1: Socioeconomic	High skilled (+) Higher Education (+) Western nationals (+) Other migrants (+) Employers (+) Illiterate (-) Unskilled (-)	5.46914	28.78497	<i>Class, knowledge and “privileged” migrant groups</i>
Factor 2: Household characteristics	Single parents (+) Soviet Greeks (+) Soviet Union (+) Unemployed (+) Owners (-)	4.14179	21.79891	<i>Socially unlucky and immigrants from the former Soviet Union</i>
Factor 3: Demographic	Age<15 (+) Housing after 1996 (+) Economically active (+) Age>65 (-)	3.50711	18.45848	<i>Youngsters in new homes</i>
Factor 4: Housing conditions	Albanian migrants (+) House with no heating (+) Housing Space <15m ² (+)	2.07923	10.94330	<i>Freezing Albanians in overcrowded housing</i>

It was then useful to estimate each factor’s score for the 31 geographic units of the GTA. These scores depict the importance of each factor in the Municipalities, or, in other words, it allows us to group together the areas that are most likely to fall under each factor. The higher the score in each factor, the most likely the area is to belong to each of the four categories presented in the previous Table. These scores are presented in Table C7, where higher ones are marked in bold, while the most representative cases for each factor are in red colour. This Table is useful in order to cartographically represent the findings of the factor analysis. Such an exercise will draw the picture of the city’s social geography as emerging from the

2001 Census, which not only provides statistical proof of the more background discussion held earlier in this chapter, but also offers a preliminary socio-spatial characterisation of the city's various districts before moving on to the Cluster analysis, which elaborates on more detailed insights. Certainly, the methodological limitations stemming from the spatial scale used in the analysis - i.e. Municipalities - may be to an extent restrictive. Still however, mapping the factor scores is illustrative of key spatial features of the urban social structure, which make sense even in the case of the considerably larger Municipality of Thessaloniki - the one more likely to bias our results. Using each factor's score for all Municipalities we created the following maps (Map C2).

Table C7: Factor analysis scores by municipality

MUNICIPALITY	Factor 1: Socioeconomic	Factor 2: Household characteristics	Factor 3: Demographic	Factor 4: Housing conditions
THESSALONIKI	1,500649966	0,859142655	-1,735066569	0,161593919
AGIOS PAVLOS	0,952228083	0,903276923	-0,692663401	1,001552605
AMBELOKIPOI	-0,098775042	1,594750676	-0,515707629	-0,625676386
ELEFThERIO-KORDELIO	-0,876268383	1,648450685	1,053954785	-0,339864671
EVOSMOS	-0,55941311	0,745105424	1,237570535	-0,645164583
KALAMARIA	0,993831599	0,127882734	-0,759685973	-1,696514923
MENEMENI	-0,867673799	1,392098276	0,320442973	0,545005925
NEAPOLI	-0,008709442	1,483880168	-0,640699981	-0,213254848
PANORAMA	2,740205079	-0,814618312	0,512949325	-0,68175518
POLIHNI	-0,656312103	0,80503272	0,511247929	-0,801594404
PYLAIA	0,708835416	-0,433059114	-0,186771163	-1,448278955
STAVROUPOLI	-0,428067215	1,110110875	0,258156115	-0,632792029
SYKIES	-0,044039921	0,829584284	-0,009890356	-0,019004619
TRIANDRIA	1,256415454	0,516798537	-1,488808148	-1,038279241
EFKARPIA commune	-1,613248002	0,658224508	0,968525053	-0,403970517
PEFKA commune	0,780449751	-1,421773824	2,735111114	-0,36836668
EHEDOROS	-0,55648089	0,171966556	0,779379669	2,073806102
THERMI	0,579896254	-0,5475721	1,05998805	0,038629028
KALLITHEA	-1,192330495	-0,620134927	-0,063223641	0,482554846
HORTIATIS	0,109658882	-0,358148518	-0,026693228	0,302960048
OREOKASTRO	0,630719121	-0,787204715	1,842275429	-0,902647291
AGIOS ATHANASIOS	-0,417783646	-0,91071102	-0,745454931	0,74944156
AXIOS	-1,370320067	-0,922718947	-0,708213605	-0,747191765
VASILIKA	-0,49411534	-1,305454488	-0,493088709	1,590210368
EPANOMI	-0,355924399	-0,893219113	-0,782853675	0,945734721
THERMAIKOS	1,352657002	0,818131845	0,962340981	2,544939267
KOUFALIA	-0,906189703	-0,987883894	-1,364707533	-0,617368981
MIHANIONA	0,398630515	0,183306587	-0,666173746	1,34121563
MIKRA	0,523899741	-1,494807779	-0,168606603	0,078121829
HALASTRA	-1,510099341	-1,097637438	-0,255145771	-1,033306744
HALKIDONA	-0,572325967	-1,252799264	-0,938487294	0,35926597



The first map of our *Socioeconomic* Factor 1 clearly illustrates the east-west social divide which was described earlier as a major characteristic of Thessaloniki's urban geography. Simply put, the darker areas in the map are notably the wealthier ones, concentrating the most educated sections of the population working in highly skilled jobs, with higher instance of independent economic activity and with lower shares of unskilled workers and people not having completed primary school among their residents. Notably, these are the mostly the areas to the east and south-east of the city, with the exception of the north-western suburb Oreokastro. These areas are also those hosting the majority of western-country nationals as



well as other migrants. The Municipalities exhibiting the highest scores are, rather expectedly, the central large and diverse Thessaloniki and the wealthy district of Panorama, both of which may be described as “knowledge intensive” in economic activity terms and home to the majority of the above-mentioned migrant groups. Strangely enough, also in this category lies the south-eastern Municipality of Thermaikos which we are to encounter also scoring relatively high in the second map of Factor 2 which to an extent describes disadvantage. This can be attributed to the relative social and ethnic mix in this seaside suburb and its proximity to the knowledge-intensive, territorially large, though scarcely populated Municipality of Thermi. On the other hand, the interpretation of Municipalities exhibiting negative scores here is twofold. As far as the inner-city districts are concerned, the map is likely to depict the socially less privileged parts of the GTA, above all the north-western Conurbation and PUZ Municipalities, as also evident in the map of Factor 2. In respect to the outer GTA municipalities, whether east or west, the first map is rather illustrative of their socio-economic structure, as these remain rural areas of intensive agriculture – something which is again confirmed by cross-checking their equally negative scores in Factor 2 as presented in the second map.

Now the *Household Characteristics* Factor 2 is indeed indicative of the geography of social disadvantage, at least as far as unemployment, single parenthood and low home-ownership rates are concerned. The east-west social gap is relatively evident here too, though limited to the inner-city (Conurbation) municipalities only. The darker areas scoring highest represent four municipalities, all of which may be described as historically “working-class” districts and areas of almost continuous immigration as well as minority presence - involving for instance the settlement of large numbers of Asia Minor refugees in the 1920s (especially Eleftherio-Kordelio), the heavy post-war urbanisation waves, the small cluster of internal migrants from the Muslim minority of Thrace (Ambelokipoi) or the Roma settlement of Dentrepotamos (Menemeni). The Municipality of Thessaloniki’s size and social mix positions it high in this map too, which for different reasons sketched above is also the case for seaside Thermaikos in the south-east. Notably, these are the areas concentrating large shares of immigrants in general, but especially of Soviet Greeks and other migrants from former Soviet countries. On the other hand, PUZ and outer GTA districts scoring negatively here are, with the exception of wealthy districts and suburbs as explained above, reflecting the demographic, productive and employment structures in the rural parts of the GTA, namely more traditional family patterns, lower instances of unemployment and high rates of home-ownership.

The map of the *Demographics* Factor 3 pictures to an extent population trends in Greater Thessaloniki. Despite some differences, it bears striking similarities to Map C1 used earlier to show 1991-2001 population change. Although it only captures of course 2001 population characteristics, mapping this factor appears illustrative of suburbanisation processes that involve both high construction activity (buildings after 1996) and the younger age structure of the population (higher shares of children and lower of people over 65, large proportions of economically active among residents) in the PUZ. Finally, the last map of Factor 4 is indicative of the *Housing Conditions* across the GTA, basically of properties without central heating and of a small housing space. The darker outer districts may be indicative of conditions in rural districts that include villages in the traditional sense of the term. Thermaikos is perhaps an exception reflecting the type of housing, perhaps recently built, as well as presence of high density households, including many migrants. The larger black area bordering the conurbation to the west is Ehedoros Municipality, home to the city’s main industrial zone which involves housing provided by employers often at workplaces, where conditions are usually of lower standards. On the other hand, the small dark spot at the north of Thessaloniki municipality represents the district of Agios Pavlos, hosting the “Upper Town”, the older part of the city with houses dating back to the Ottoman years. As we are going to see in the next chapter, all those areas (though not exclusively) are home to significant numbers of immigrants, among which Albanians form a majority group. But before getting to the details of migrants’ presence in the city, the Cluster analysis that follows elaborates more on the discussion about Thessaloniki’s social geography.

Map C2: Mapping the factor analysis results






C.3.2. Cluster analysis

In order to identify how Municipalities can be grouped in terms of common characteristics, a cluster analysis was applied to their scores in the four factors. The identification of seven clusters was adopted as the optimal grouping at the Municipal level. Those seven clusters are presented in Map C3 and described below.

Cluster 1: This cluster singles out the Municipality of Thessaloniki, including the old historical center of the City, along with the adjacent municipality of Triandria. The analysis revealed that the separation between the two municipalities is only at the administrative level; Triandria can be seen as a part of the wider Municipality of Thessaloniki in terms of its socio territorial characteristics. On the whole this spatial unit is characterised by considerable demographic decline, which is the outcome of increasing suburbanisation trends. As it has been already shown, Triandria and Thessaloniki are the only Municipalities of the Conurbation whose population had decreased from 1991 to 2001 (4.5% and 5.2% respectively). Yet, we should note that this remains a very densely populated area. The quality of the building stock is very diverse spanning from scattered old-neoclassic housing, and the prestigious apartments on the seafront to low or medium quality blocks built back in the 1960s and 1970s at the west, northern and central-east parts of the Municipality.

As already pointed out, in terms of its socioeconomic characteristics this area presents a considerable internal heterogeneity. It is characterised both by the presence of a highly skilled and educated population but at the same time exhibits high scores at the second factor. This diversity mirrors the structure and composition of the population in these inner Municipalities, which spans across all socioeconomic strata. The city-centre itself, despite ongoing suburbanisation, emerging trends of gentrification and changes relating to the restructuring of economic activities and shifting social uses of space, is also socially mixed, including upper and middle-class class “old” Thessaloniceans, small shop-owners, students and immigrants. So while for instance the old seafront is a wealthy neighbourhood with nice sea view apartments and a bustling nightlife, the streets north of St Dimitris Str. and Vardaris Square are increasingly “downgrading” and attract more and more students, youngsters and immigrants. The city centre also concentrates the highest proportion of tenants as opposed to homeowners, since it attracts more people looking for relatively temporary residence (public servants, students, migrants).

Map C3: Cluster analysis: grouping of territorial units in Greater Thessaloniki



Since this cluster concentrates nearly half the total GTA population, it is worthwhile paying attention to the spatial dynamics of its socioeconomic diversity. For example, previous studies drawing on data from the 1991 Census (Maloutas 2000: see maps pp. 46, 52-4, 60-6) mapped the city's social geography the east-west divide by mapping upper and middle class residents downtown, by the seafront and at the southern part of the Municipality. At the time, however, processes of suburbanisation were probably already evident but surely not as sharp, while immigration had only just started becoming significant, which imply that changes between 1991-2001 must have been severe. In addition, one can hypothesise that an analysis using a finer spatial scale might had resulted in a different clustering of these areas, possibly with segments of the southern part of the Municipality merging with the wealthier districts grouped in Cluster 4 and the North-Western part with the relatively "downmarket" Cluster 3, as described below.

Cluster 2 is the only one grouping that does not correspond to adjacent areas, or municipalities at the same administrative level. Contrary to that, it includes places within the Conurbation (Agios Pavlos, an old district bordering Thessaloniki), at the Peri-urban zone (Ehedoros, home to the main industrial zone) and at the Remaining Greater Thessaloniki (Mihaniona, Thermaikos, rapidly growing seaside suburbs and minor urban tourist resorts). Those areas are actually grouped together due to their scores in Factor 4 (Table C7) relating to low-quality housing conditions reflecting high density and the availability of cheap housing. This along with work opportunities (which include proximity to the centre in the case of Agios Pavlos, or to knowledge-intensive Themi in the cases of Mihaniona and Thermaikos) attracts both lower middle class strata and considerable numbers of immigrants, especially Albanians and migrants from the former Soviet Union, including ethnic Greeks. But although the three of them may be understood as relatively homogenous due to such common characteristics, Agios Pavlos seems to diverge. An old inner-city district with its southern part adjacent to Thessaloniki Municipality's "Upper Town", perhaps the only coherent "historical" neighbourhood of the city characterised by old "heritage" buildings and an urban structure directly inherited from its Ottoman past. The whole area, home to a diverse population, both old and young, settled, transit or new, is ultimately marked by preservation and regeneration projects and gentrification trends, which reinforce its socioeconomic proximity with Cluster 1.

Cluster 3 is a proof that despite an overall low socio-spatial polarisation, a West-East division is evident in Thessaloniki. This cluster corresponds to the Western districts of the Conurbation, which are more of a working class character. It is also the Cluster that has attracted the majority of migrants from the former Soviet Union (ethnic Greeks and others) and hosts large numbers of immigrants in general. Their presence in the area, which relates to the availability of cheap housing and land, as well as other reasons which will be explained in detail in the following chapter, reinforces the cluster's long established working class character. Cluster 3 has the highest unemployment levels, the highest levels of employment in unskilled occupations and presents considerable coherence in all factors across its municipalities. It is also characterised by relatively low quality housing (particularly the inner districts), high population density and lack of free (public, green) space. However, this should not be overstressed since urban planning and housing quality within the Conurbation does not present extreme differences. Another negative aspect of the areas under discussion is its proximity to the industrial zone although de-industrialization and the relocation of industry may be indicators of socioeconomic change in the near future. Currently, for example, certain new areas are being built with better standards and well-designed open space attracting also middle class families. Nea Politia, a newly build neighbourhood within the Municipality of Evosmos, and parts of the municipality of Efkarpia are cases in point here constituting "middle class pockets" within the cluster. Those municipalities almost doubled their population within the last decade.

Cluster 4 corresponds to the more well-off Eastern districts and completes the picture of the West-East division of the Conurbation. It hosts a highly educated population working in highly skilled occupations, or as free lance professionals and business-owners and has rather low

unemployment levels. The housing stock is of better quality and there is generally better urban planning and more free space. Due to high rent prices the area has an overall low presence of immigrants. Yet, it hosts a considerable number of Western immigrants as well as the highly skilled segment of certain nationalities, such as Yugoslavians and Turks. The concentration of Filipinos at the municipality of Panorama concerns Filipino women working as live-in domestic servants. This Municipality, a erstwhile village of 1922 Pontic refugees - is becoming an exclusive upper middle class district and appears to be the most dynamic district in terms of its demographic trends. Similarly to the case in Cluster 3, however, there are “working-class” pockets in this area too, as for instance in Foinikas, a social housing neighbourhood situated right at the northeast edge of posh, spacious and seaside Kalamaria.

Cluster 5 groups also middle-upper class areas; less affluent than Panorama, but equally so to the other areas of Cluster 4. It has however a more suburban character, it is relatively new and less well connected to the urban fabric. At the same time it presents a much more dynamic demography. Actually, it is the area of Greater Thessaloniki with the youngest population and the largest activity rates (along with Evosmos). It is also the area, which has increased the most during from the previous Census (along with Thermaikos). The housing stock of this cluster is of very good quality and a large share of it is very new: e.g. more than half of the houses in Pefka were built after 1996. Immigrants' presence is low overall, except from a concentration of Soviet Greeks at the South edge of Oreokastro, which refers to a self-generated unauthorized settlement.

Cluster 6 combines PUZ and outer GTA municipalities characterised by both emerging suburban settlements and villages peripheral to the city. With a few exceptions (e.g. Thermi), areas in this Cluster are not that well integrated to and connected with the rest of the urban tissue. Cluster 6 is characterised by a considerably low building density in comparison to the clusters presented so far. The Municipalities of Hortiatia to the north and Mikra and Thermi to the southeast appear to be more clearly suburban, whereas the rest maintain basically rural economic functions. The case of Thermi is rather exceptional due to both population trends and economic spatial uses. If it was only for the former, parts of it would resemble the bordering wealthy areas of Cluster 4, as it increasingly attracts relatively young middle-class professionals escaping the inner city. This is perhaps not the case owing to the diversity of its economic functions, ranging from small-scale production to large commercial outlets, entertainments industries and a growing knowledge intensive sector (it is home to Thessaloniki's Technological Park). These features may account to an extent for the presence of immigrants in the area, most notably Albanians as well as a cluster of ethnic Greek (Sarakatsani) Bulgarians. In general, the whole Cluster hosts a sizeable part of Albanian and East European immigrants.

Cluster 7, finally, depicts the rural fringe in the Delta of the river Axios and the Municipality of Koufalia at the northwest edge of the GTA. These areas have retained their rural character, with villages rather than suburbs, which are however intrinsically linked to the urban economy as they specialise in intensive agriculture and cattle breeding, as well as small manufacturing units often related to the nearby industrial zone. These areas have low population density and connection to the city is rather poor. Their population structure is characterised by an aging population, with overall a rather low educational profile and relatively high unemployment rates. The immigrant population in these areas is rather low and the dominant group would be Albanian migrants.

Part D - Ethnic geography of the city

D.1. Immigrants in Thessaloniki

By the early 2000s, Thessaloniki Prefecture concentrated nearly 9% of Greece's foreign population, as - with the notable exception of Athens - the distribution of the immigrants in the country follows more or less similar patterns to those applying to Greece's total population (see Table D1)¹⁶. The Table below, based on data on foreign nationals only, looks at the position of Thessaloniki within the population and migration map of Greece as a whole. Accordingly, although Thessaloniki emerges as the second major area of settlement for immigrants in Greece following Athens, it does not appear to be as significantly affected by the presence of immigrants as other regions in the country, in terms of the migrants' share in its overall population. As earlier stressed, however, this picture would change dramatically if one took into account the relative weight of Soviet Greeks, one third of whom was residing in the Prefecture in 2000¹⁷. As mentioned in Part A, their settlement was managed by the state and followed rather historically-inspired patterns based on ideological (national) considerations, although their subsequent mobility is likely to have diverged.

Table D1: Regional distribution of the foreign population

REGION	geographical distributions		immigrants % of regional population
	total population	foreign nationals	
Western Greece	6.6	4.6	4.9
Central Greece	5.1	5.2	7.1
Peloponnese	5.5	6.3	8.0
Ionian islands	1.9	2.6	9.3
Epirus	3.1	2.1	4.7
Thessaly	6.8	4.2	4.3
Western Macedonia	2.7	1.2	3.0
Central Macedonia	17.2	13.1	5.3
<i>Thessaloniki Prefecture</i>	9.9	8.8	6.2
Eastern Macedonia & Thrace	5.6	2.0	2.5
South Aegean	2.7	3.7	9.4
North Aegean	1.9	1.3	4.7
Crete	5.4	5.3	6.8
Attica	35.6	48.6	9.5
<i>Athens Prefecture</i>	25.7	36.1	9.8
<i>Piraeus Prefecture</i>	5.1	5.4	7.4
Greece	10,934,097	761,813	7.0

Source: NSSG, Census 2001 (tables given to EUROSTAT), Usual Resident Population.

The point we would like to make here is that Thessaloniki exhibits certain particularities that in our opinion make its case particularly interesting. These are also reflected in the composition of its migrant 'stock', comprising, for instance, mainly of migrants from the Balkans (though with a lower share of Albanians than in the rest of the country) and the former USSR, including ethnic Greeks, as compared to the prevalence of Balkan immigrants throughout Greece and a far greater diversity in Athens (Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2008).

¹⁶ Data on foreign nationals for the whole of Greece as described here and Table D1 are based on a different census dataset that the one used in our analysis (counting the usual resident population).


¹⁷ Data on Soviet Greeks mentioned here are quoted by 2001; Katsavounidou & Kourti (2006) based on the survey done by the General Secretariat of Repatriating Ethnic Greeks in 1997, 1999 and 2000.

The 2001 Census recorded nationals of 217 different countries nationally, 207 in Athens and just 132 in Thessaloniki. On the other hand, the dominance of migrants from the Balkans, Black Sea and Caucasus regions may suggest that historical transnational ties the city held in past centuries seem to be currently re-emerging through migration (*ibid.*). These features give birth to questions surrounding the *place* of immigrants in the city. But before moving onto the details of Thessaloniki's migrant population and ethnic geography, it is important to give a brief overview of its history of migration.

D.1.1. Recent history of population settlement and migration to the city

As already described in the first chapter, immigration to Greece is a phenomenon that started becoming significant only in the beginning of the 1990s: Thessaloniki was not an exception to that. The immigrant population recorded by the 1991 Census formed a share of just 1.6% in the Conurbation. As seen in the following map only two out of the sixteen municipalities had an immigrant population above 3% whereas in 2001 only one municipality had immigrant population below 5% and the majority concentrated more than 10%. Since there was not an explicit attempt to look at immigration, the 1991 Census under-recorded immigrant residents, especially undocumented ones¹⁸. According to estimates, the actual number of immigrants in 1991 could double that recorded by the Census (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Yet, even this was the case the situation does not differentiate substantially. The grand picture for 1991 is of an overall low immigrant population and of no significant immigrant concentrations in the City. Furthermore, the above figure serves well as a graphic presentation of the dramatic immigration increase in the City during the decade 1991-2001.

Map D1: Migrants residential concentrations in Thessaloniki by Municipality, 1991-2001



¹⁸ The data presented here also do not include those Soviet Greeks who had got the Greek nationality by the time of the Census. Yet, in 1991 the number of naturalised Soviet Greek should have been relatively small.

Having said that, a glance back in the not-so-old history of the city may be revealing of population movements and social trends that, although born in radically different historical contexts, bare striking analogies with today's pathways towards immigration and ethnic diversity. As Baldwin-Edwards and Apostolatu (2008) have recently reminded us, the assertion that Greece has shifted from a country of emigration to one of immigration is oblivious to almost continuous population movements involving mass immigration, driven by politics, ethnicity and religion, which marked the Greek 20th century and the consolidation of the national state. There is perhaps no other place in Greece where this is more evident than in Thessaloniki. Built at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, in a natural harbour where the Balkans meet the Aegean, it has been an important administrative and economic centre since Hellenistic times in the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and hosted for centuries Sephardic Jews after their expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula. At the dawn of the 20th century, the second Ottoman Census of 1902 counted a population of about 126,000, whereby Jews formed nearly 49%. By the time the city became part of the Greek state, in 1913, the share of Jews in a total population of about 158,000 was still high though declined at 39%, followed by 29% Muslims (mostly Turks), 25.3% Greek-Orthodox, 4% Bulgarians, and the rest comprising of Roma, Armenians, Westerners and various others (Molho 1996: 16; also Veinstein 1996; Mazower 2004).

This history, well embodied in the urban landscape until not so long ago, has now faded after less than a century within the borders of the Greek nation-state: the 1917 fire destroyed most of the urban core, largely inhabited by Jews, and left dozens of thousands homeless; the Muslims left with the population exchange that followed Greece's defeat in the 1919–1922 war, and the Jews were deported (and most of them killed) by the Nazis during the Second World War. Meanwhile, the city received about 117,000 Greek-Orthodox refugees from Anatolia, a development which determined in itself the dynamics of urban development in the interwar era and beyond (Hastaoglou-Martinidis 1997). After the war, as already mentioned, processes of rapid urbanisation, industrial development and urban growth, combined with the pre-war urban inheritance, gave way to the east-west pattern in the city's social geography. Urbanisation processes have been linked to subsequent waves of international (out) and internal (in) migration, which may have been reversed in the 1970s but actually never ceased. The economic shifts towards the tertiary sector and the education "boom" since the 1970s continue to bring students and workers in the city. Suburbanisation trends are evident since the 1980s but rather intensified in the 1990s, as previously discussed.

Currently, the significant presence of immigrants and the gradual formation of immigrant neighbourhoods has altered to a certain extent Thessaloniki's urban landscape, producing new or alternative urban geographies (Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2008; Hatziprokopiou 2006). Before we go on to explore the geography of immigrants' residence, it is necessary to introduce them first: the next section sketches the profile of immigrants in the city, the major groups and their key social characteristics as emerging from the 2001 Census.

D.1.2. Immigrants in Thessaloniki: major groups and key characteristics

The vast majority of the prefecture's 112,000-strong migrant population (more than 90%) live in Greater Thessaloniki, 82% of them in the Conurbation. The highest concentration is in the Peri-Urban Zone, whereby their share in the population approaches 12%. As shown in Table D2, the largest groups in the GTA are Albanians (25.1%) and Georgians (13.1%), followed by Russians, Armenians, Cypriots (to a large extent possibly students), Armenians and Bulgarians. Soviet Greeks altogether form the most numerous group, with a 28.7% share among all migrants, but they remain a diverse community in terms of origin (coming mostly from Georgia and Russia, and to a lesser extent Armenia and the Ukraine, as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). For the purposes of our analysis we refer to them as a single category, based on their differentiated status, and for similar reasons we grouped together: migrants from the old EU-15 and other Western countries (of Europe, North America and

Oceania), constituting 11.7% of the total; migrants from the former USSR (excluding Georgians) whose share is 11.1%; immigrants from Eastern Europe, predominantly the Balkans (including Turkey) at 5.4% (of whom the largest groups, i.e. Bulgarians and to a lesser extent Romanians, have recently acquired EU status but this was not the case at the time of the Census); and the diverse range of other nationalities who form the remaining 2% (including small but vibrant communities, such as the Nigerians and Chinese, or fairly longstanding ones like Philipinos). Clearly, the presence of migrants from the former Soviet Union, whether ethnic Greeks or not, weights considerably upon the city's immigrant population as they together constitute more than half of the total; followed by about another third from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, including Albanians. The Table below lists our seven main groups and gives examples of selected nationalities, including minor groups which are however important in specific localities, such as the Nigerians and Chinese, as we are going to see.

Table D2: Immigrants in Thessaloniki: main groups and residential concentrations

NATIONALITIES	GTA	CON	THES	PUZ	remaining GTA
all Migrants (% of total)	10.8	10.9	11.6	12.0	9.4
Soviet Greeks (% of migrants)	28.7	30.3	20.8	27.0	16.9
foreign nationals (% of migrants)	71.3	69.7	79.2	73.0	83.1
<i>non EU/'West'</i> (% of foreign nationals)	83.6	82.5	81.7	89.6	87.1
EU & Western countries (% of migrants)	11.7	12.2	14.5	7.6	10.7
Albania	28.1	25.1	30.6	38.7	44.8
Georgia	13.1	13.9	16.1	7.7	10.8
former Soviet Union (remaining)	11.1	11.8	10.2	8.7	7.3
Balkans & Eastern Europe (incl. Turkey)	5.4	4.6	4.9	9.4	8.2
Others	1.9	2.1	2.9	0.9	1.3
Russia	8.9	9.7	7.7	8.0	4.5
Cyprus	4.4	5.2	7.1	1.4	1.2
Bulgaria	3.5	2.5	2.3	10.0	5.4
Armenia	4.1	4.6	3.6	1.6	2.3
Germany	2.3	2.2	1.8	2.4	3.0
USA	2.3	2.5	2.5	1.2	1.5
Australia	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.0
UK	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.7
Italy	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.8	1.1
Sweden	0.9	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.7
Turkey	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.4	0.9
Yugoslavia	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.6
France	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.4
Africa (excl. Nigeria)	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.4
Nigeria	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.0
Philippines	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1
China	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0

In the lack of reliable data it is rather difficult to estimate the proportion of undocumented immigrants at the time of the Census. Residence permit statistics from the region authorities for 2007 (www.rcm.gr) refer to a total of 140,000 permits that have been issued to date across the Prefecture, though less than 20,500 are valid with another 14,700 being processed. Assuming that the overall migrant population remained the same, and taking out the nearly 32000 Soviet Greeks, as well as Cypriots and EU-27 nationals, and speculating on the proportion of ethnic Greeks among Albanians who are subject to a different status at a

rate of one in three, we are left with about 20500 people without legal status, i.e. about one fifth of all migrants, or one fourth among foreign nationals. Of these of course, some would have been on a visa, or married to a Greek/EU national, or have in the meantime naturalised, while a limited number are refugees or asylum seekers. But one should not rule out the possibility of an increase in the migrant population due to new arrivals.

Regarding the major characteristics of Thessaloniki's immigrants on the basis of the Census, the paragraphs and tables that follow attempt to generally sketch their socioeconomic profiles, in some cases by giving details for specific groups. As already implied in our preliminary discussion of the factor analysis in the previous chapter, now clearly shown in Table D3, the majority of immigrants are at working age in larger shares than the indigenous population, and they are on average younger. This in a sense is self-explanatory, as the primary motive of migration has been to find work, generate an income, and make a living, especially for the majority of non-western, non-ethnic Greek immigrants. But while the share of children below 15 years old appears to be high among non-“western” foreign nationals, this does not seem to be the case for those from the EU and other Western countries, neither for Soviet Greeks. In the former case, with a considerably lower proportion of older people above 65, this indicates mostly a working population. In the latter case, however, the explanation may be twofold. Firstly, Soviet Greeks immigrated not simply because of financial/employment needs, but primarily due to the disintegration of their home states and the conflicts that emerged – coupled of course with the intention to return to an “ancestral homeland” (the nation-state centre of the Diaspora), which had formally invited them. This implies that they largely followed family migration patterns involving the entire household. The second part of the explanation though implies a methodological twist relating to our way of estimating the population of Soviet Greeks in Census statistics: as we have included Greek citizens born in the former Soviet Union, we obviously face the bias of losing their children, who are of course Greek citizens and have been born in Greece. Notably, this is the group with the higher instances of single parenthood, while all other migrants seem to follow below the indigenous population's share in that respect.

Table D3: Comparative age structure and family situation of migrants in Greater Thessaloniki

Migrant groups	age structure			single parents
	>15	15-65	<65	
Greeks	15.6	69.8	14.6	7.7
Soviet Greeks	11.6	75.0	13.5	10.3
Westerners	11.9	81.4	6.6	6.2
All others	17.6	78.8	3.6	7.0

Turning to education levels now, interestingly these appear to be on average higher among migrants than in the indigenous population. Particularly the shares of people with no completed primary education (“illiterate”) are lower: 10.2% of foreign nationals and 9.2% of Soviet Greeks, as compared to 12.7% of local Greeks. The share of those holding university degrees are somehow different, although still depict immigrants in general as a relatively well-educated part of the labour force: while 19% of Soviet Greeks have had university education this is the case for 15.6% of the rest of migrants (including westerners), compared to 18.7% among the local population. Still, however, one would encounter significant differences if looked at the variations between migrants of different origins: migrants from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the EU (15) and other western countries, as well as many of the remaining, are overall highly educated on average compared to the indigenous population, but the shares of those with a university degree drop perhaps because of the overall weight of Albanian migrants who are more likely to have completed some form of technical/professional education.

But while the overall education level of immigrants in general remains relatively high, this is not translated into a position in the labour market that matches their qualifications, confirming the structural forces behind immigrants' economic integration in Greece and the “deskilling”

experiences pointed out by previous studies (e.g. Hatziprokopiou 2006). Clearly, while, as we have seen, immigrants constitute no more than 11% of the Greater Thessaloniki population, they represent about 30% of the GTA's labour force working in unskilled jobs, nearly one third of whom are Soviet Greeks, i.e. the group with the highest qualifications. This is evident if one looks into their labour market characteristics, for instance at their sectoral employment¹⁹: at a Prefecture level, 23.3 percent were employed in construction, 21.1 percent in manufacturing, 7.4 percent in agriculture and the remaining majority in various services. Findings of empirical studies (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Labrianidis et al. 2004; Hatziprokopiou 2003; 2004; 2006; Pratsinakis 2005) confirm official data and reveal important details. The work migrants do is mainly manual, physically demanding, often of a servile character, and, for the majority, in low-skilled positions: domestic workers (cleaners, carers, maintenance/repair workers), manual labourers (in manufacture and construction), and assistants in retail stores and trading companies. A significant share are skilled labourers (machine operators, craftsmen, skilled builders, painters, electricians, plumbers, etc.) while there is also a minority of professionals, entrepreneurs and white-collar workers. There is a clear differentiation in employment patterns of male and female migrants: men mostly work as manual workers in construction sites, factories, workshops, trading companies and storerooms, while women are usually employed as domestic servants and carers, manufacture workers (clothing), assistants in cafes, bars and restaurants or in retail shops. The main types of employers are usually either small/medium sized enterprises, in many cases family owned, or individuals and households, reflecting broadly the crisis of small businesses and the expansion of the middle classes. Moreover an unidentifiable share of immigrants is employed informally, often despite holding legal status, reflecting the extent of the underground economy which has largely driven their labour market integration.

Table D4: Comparative occupational Status

	employers	self-employed	assistants in family business	waged
Greeks	16.0	14.2	3.0	66.8
all migrants	3.6	6.8	0.9	88.7
Soviet Greeks	4.0	7.2	0.7	88.0
Albanians	1.2	5.1	0.7	93.0
Eastern Europeans	5.9	6.3	1.5	86.3
Westerners	12.9	10.9	1.9	74.2
former Soviet Union	2.0	6.3	1.1	90.6
Georgians	1.4	6.4	0.5	91.6
Others	12.2	18.2	1.3	68.3

Immigrants are in their majority waged employees. As Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou point out in a forthcoming publication, there is mere evidence that this might be currently subject to change, with the recent shift of many towards self-employment and entrepreneurship, increasingly evident across the city. Still though, as shown in the above Table, back in 2001 all migrant groups exhibited lower rates of independent economic activities compared to the indigenous population, and the rates for the most numerous groups are significantly lower, with Albanians having by far the lowest entrepreneurship rates. The only exception is among migrants in the diverse "Others" category: although their share of employers is relatively high though still lower than that of the Greeks, their proportion of self-employed is considerably high, rising altogether the share of those involved in independent economic activities at more than 30%, i.e. higher than that of the equivalent for Greeks. It is likely that this should be attributed to high entrepreneurship rates among particular nationalities which increase the aggregate: such obvious examples are for instance the Chinese, Nigerians and other Africans, as well as migrants from middle-eastern countries. On the other hand, the shares of

¹⁹ Again, these data are obtained from a different dataset (the NSSG tables for the EUROSTAT), they are based on the usual resident population and concern foreign nationals only.

employers and self-employed are also relatively high among Western-country nationals, though not as those of the Greeks.

Table D5: Comparative unemployment rates

	GTA	CON	THES	PUZ	GTA rest
ALL	11.5	11.7	11.1	10	10.8
Greeks	11.3	11.5	10.8	10	10.6
Soviet Greeks	17.1	17	16.6	15.3	20.7
non Western	11.6	12.2	11.7	8.4	9.8
Westerners	10.6	10.4	9.9	10.4	13

Unemployment was so far not been thought of as common among immigrants, resulting for the structural demand for their cheap and flexible labour, and in any case would be mostly temporary. The census depicted an overall unemployment rate among migrants slightly higher than that for Greeks. However, here too, there are significant differences between different immigrant groups. The most notable ones, as Table D5 illustrates, concern the relatively low unemployment among nationals of EU-15 and other Western countries, the only large group for whom the rate drops below that for Greeks, for rather obvious reasons. On the other hand, while the remaining “non-western” third country nationals do not exhibit a significantly high unemployment rate, this is certainly not the case for Soviet Greeks. Their considerably high unemployment at a rate of 17.1%, which exceeds 20.7% in the outer GTA municipalities, is alarming but indicative of situations that have been observed elsewhere in respect to this group, for instance in Western Athens (Halkos & Salamouris 2003).

Table D6: Comparative housing status and living space

	Greeks		foreign nationals		Homogeneis	
	Owners	Tenants	Owners	Tenants	Owners	Tenants
HOUSING STATUS						
GTA	76.4	18.2	21.3	75.2	43.3	53.7
CON	74.5	20.5	20.1	77.1	42.4	54.9
THES	70.7	24.6	17.2	80.7	34.7	63.1
PUZ	81.4	10.7	25.7	67.2	52.4	41.1
GTA rest	86.9	6.8	26.7	66.6	45	50.9
LIVING SPACE	<15 m²	>40 m²	<15 m²	>40 m²	<15 m²	>40 m²
GTA	7.7	20.7	37.3	9.9	33.1	7.3
CON	7.4	20.4	36.3	10.1	32.5	7.5
THES	6	24.4	38.9	10.4	40.4	8.2
PUZ	8.5	24	37.7	9.2	31.4	7.8
GTA rest	9.4	20.8	44.6	9.3	44.9	4.9


Finally, a note on immigrants’ housing discussing the information presented on Table D6. In general, migrants appear to be disproportionately tenants, while Greeks are rather disproportionately homeowners. While this latter may be attributed to earlier urbanisation processes, the former has a rather easy explanation relating to the novelty of immigration and the institutional (legal status, which only recently became possible for the majority) and structural (i.e. their position in the labour market, lower pay, discrimination, or the need of many to remit, etc.) conditions immigrants are faced with. The exceptional case here is again that of Soviet Greeks: although more than half of them remain tenants they have considerably high shares of homeownership and the trend is likely to continue. Although this may seem to contrast their position in the labour market as previously sketched, it should be interpreted as the outcome of not simply the legal status of migrants in this group (eventually citizenship), but also the use of state-funded housing loans as a special integration tool, with newly-bought homes lying mostly in Thessaloniki’s western districts (Katsavounidou & Kourti

2006; 2008). These do not seem however to be of particularly high standards, as implied by the small housing space enjoyed by a large share in this group, comparable – though slightly more moderate – to the rest of the migrants, but not at all to the living conditions enjoyed by the indigenous population. Since housing translates to residence, which has been the key-tool in our cartographic exercises, the analysis and maps that follow will offer further insights into the above, bringing the discussion to the key question surrounding the city's ethnic geography.

D.2. Geographical distribution of the migrant population

In a similar fashion to the total population distribution, by the 2001 Census almost 95% percent of the immigrant population in the prefecture lived in the GTA, of which 78% in the Conurbation. The Map D2 pictures immigrants' residential distribution at the time. We have already explained that despite the east-west social gap, social divisions in Thessaloniki are not sharply expressed in spatial terms, but remain moderate due to a wide middle-class dispersed across the city. The migrants' insertion in the urban corpus broadly follows this pattern since they are also dispersed all over the city. They live mostly in those areas identified as working class districts by the factor-cluster analysis; however they are not completely excluded from the more prosperous neighbourhoods. Except from the highly skilled immigrants, a smaller number of labour immigrants live in better off neighbourhoods as well. This points to the fact that although there are significant differences in rent prices across the city, relatively cheap housing can be found in most areas of the urban tissue. It also reveals additional factors that condition immigrants' areas of residence, such as the type of their work and the location of their workplace, as well as their social networks which may attract them in particular areas (Hatziprokopiou 2006). Generally immigrants tend to occupy cheap apartments in the basements or ground floors intensifying an already existing vertical social differentiation pattern, characteristic to Greek cities at large (Leontidou 1990; Maloutas 2004). The Map below pictures immigrants' residential distribution at the time of the Census: the majority lived in the inner-city, with the highest concentration in the Municipality of Thessaloniki and significant shares in the north-west part of the Conurbation, confirming earlier results of empirical surveys (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Hatziprokopiou 2006). Fewer migrants live in the PZU and the rest of the GTA, particularly the outer villages of Axios, Halastra and Halkidona to the west and Epanomi to the south.

Map D2: Immigrants' residential dispersion in Greater Thessaloniki



In 2001, the central Municipality of Thessaloniki hosted nearly 40% percent of the immigrant population. The high number of immigrants living in the central Municipality is not surprising since it constitutes a densely populated area concentrating more than one third of the total population of Greater Thessaloniki. Moreover it is an area with significant availability in rented housing. The distribution of immigrants within the municipality is not smooth following the internal social divisions characterising the city; the majority of immigrants live at the west and northern part where the cheapest housing is available, and to a lesser extent in the central-eastern districts. Except from the central Municipality of Thessaloniki a significant number of immigrants are also found to live in the Western part of the Conurbation as well as in the Municipalities of Ehedoros (no17) and Thermaikos (no26) at the West and the East-South of the Peri-urban Zone respectively. The rest of the municipalities host an even and small number of immigrants.

Since access to housing for immigrants in Thessaloniki depends on private sector lettings, the housing market and less so immigrants' social networks or work availability shape the above-described broad picture. Hatziprokopiou (2006 :120), based on the results of a survey of Albanian and Bulgarian migrants, shows that the location of immigrants' workplace is also widespread all over the city and mirrors the urban economic geography of Thessaloniki; the city-centre concentrates numerous activities, mostly services of all types whereas the main industrial complex is located in the north-western part (Ehedoros no17) and a second production zone is found in the south-east (Thermi no18). At the same time commercial activities are generally diffused and smaller scale activities in all sectors are dispersed all over the city. Immigrants workplace also depends on the 'space' migrants occupy in the local labour market (certain types of jobs, in certain sectors) and to the character of their labour (flexibility, low cost). (Hatziprokopiou 2006:120). In order to assess this, it would be useful to examine the relationship between immigrants' residence and place of work, as emerging out of the Census. The next Table presents workplace location of our major groups:

Table D7: Location of immigrants' workplace

	Not in permanent place	Within usual residence	In municipality or community of usual residence	In another municipality or community	In a foreign country
Greeks	3,9	0,4	58,3	37,3	0,2
Homogeneis	7,1	0,5	59,2	32,7	0,4
Albania	5,9	0,2	76,2	16,5	1,2
Balkans & Eastern Europe	4,8	0,6	58,8	23,0	12,8
Westerners	3,6	0,5	58,3	28,7	8,9
former Soviet Union	8,0	0,5	63,7	26,4	1,4
Georgia	9,5	0,4	70,8	18,6	0,7
Others	14,5	0,1	59,2	19,6	6,6
TOTAL	4,2	0,4	59,3	35,6	0,5

Remarkably, while very small proportions work close to their homes, and the shares of those not having a fixed workplace are greater than those for Greeks (with the exception of Westerners), reflecting the type of jobs many do (e.g. construction, casual labour, domestic service), immigrants tend to work within the boundaries of the municipalities where they actually live. The shares of those who do so are overall higher than the equivalent for Greeks and for certain groups they are considerably high (Georgians, and especially Albanians). This could be explained by the nature of their jobs, since they are paid on a daily (or hourly) basis and wasting time to move back and forth results to money losses. Thus, working place appears indeed to be an explanatory factor for the migrants' spatial concentration and dispersion in Greater Thessaloniki. But one should be cautious in assessing the explanatory power of this factor. Our data do not tell us much of certain crucial parameters in the housing market, namely rents and property prices, which would be decisive in the decision of migrants to live in particular area. Especially in territorially large municipalities, as for

instance in the Municipality of Thessaloniki itself, working within the boundaries of the municipality does not necessarily account for proximity between place of residence and place of work. As shown in the previous map, the majority of immigrants are living in the central and northwestern parts of the Conurbation and indeed it is there that we find some of their most significant concentrations as we are going to see in the next section. In northwestern Conurbation districts, some of which host a number of productive and trade activities - thus providing work opportunities for migrants - rents are generally lower and this perhaps should be seen as the determining factor. The same applies to peri-urban areas which constitute major hotspots of economic activity such as Ehedoros, and cheaper PUZ municipalities (e.g. Kalithea). On the other hand, the entire PUZ, as we have seen, has been experiencing both population growth and a construction boom, which directly or indirectly generates work opportunities while still providing for affordable options in the rental market. The presence of migrants within eastern districts, on the other hand, at least the ones wealthier ones, should be attributed merely to employment, which in “posh” areas like Panorama may involve leave-in domestic workers, gardeners, etc. Finally, those working in the outer GTA, especially in peripheral villages loosely connected with the urban core, work opportunities may be the primary factor. The centre of the city is rather exceptional in that respect, for it hosts the majority population and for being densely inhabited, and the spatial scale of analysis does allow for meaningful interpretations²⁰.


So there is indeed a connection between there between immigrants’ residential area and the location of their workplace, but this is rather weak. In an earlier phase, as Hatziprokiou (2006) had noted, the migrants’ decision about moving to a particular place for taking a job is not that much a factor of the job itself, but rather more a factor of where their contacts are located. For many, their contacts are so widely diffused around Thessaloniki that they could practically work in any part of the city. For some, whose networks are denser and spatially concentrated in particular areas, the place of residence is usually close to the place of work (Hatziprokiou 2006:120,121).



The choice of the residence relates to individual/household factors (condition of property, family needs, etc.) and it is obviously greatly influenced by the local housing market. The price of the rent plays a crucial role in deciding about the area, and even more so about the property itself. Migrants living in the more densely populated central and north-western districts, tend to occupy smaller and relatively older properties, and higher shares of them are in bad-quality accommodation usually in basements or ground floors. The Soviet Greeks have considerably higher levels of house ownership due to their favourable status and the state loans they received. Thus, their residential choices are also influenced by the availability of cheap apartments for sale or “opportunities” to build their own housing, as it will be described in more detail in the next section. Their dispersion over the city follows a considerably different pattern from that of Albanian migrants, which is comparable in size (map D3). Albanians, on the other hand, as we are going to see, owing to their numbers but also to their widespread stigmatisation, at least at an earlier stage, are diffused all over the city (Hatziprokiou 2006; Kokkali *forthcoming*), but still they generally tend to work within their municipalities of residence. On the other hand, network factors may be decisive for the residential patterns of smaller groups.


²⁰ One has of course to take in mind certain dynamics which cannot be captured by Census statistics, at least as far as non-ethnic Greek and non-western migrants are concerned. For instance, the possibility of residential mobility should not be ruled out, as it has certainly been crucial during the 1990s, with the vast majority of immigrants being undocumented and moving frequently where they could find work. Long-term residence was then likely to come out of a combination of factors: the acquisition of legal status, the move towards more stable jobs and probably better conditions and income, and the change in migratory strategies and plans e.g. with the coming or formation of migrant families in the city. So today’s picture should have changed dramatically, and frequent residential mobility might remain the case for newcomers only. In that respect, the year 2001 when the Census was conducted may be seen as a turning point: by then many migrants will have managed to sort out their status, while a second legalisation was initiated; also the majority of Soviet Greeks had already acquired citizenship; and people who had arrived at the start of the 1990s would have come up with families, probably children and thus longer term settlement plans.

The choice of the residence relates to individual/household factors (condition of property, family needs, etc.) and it is obviously greatly influenced by the local housing market. The price of the rent plays a crucial role in deciding about the area, and even more so about the property itself. Migrants living in the more densely populated central and north-western districts, tend to occupy smaller and relatively older properties, and higher shares of them are in bad-quality accommodation usually in basements or ground floors. On the other hand, the presence of immigrants in 'nice' areas, mostly to the south-east appears to be related to factors ranging from work availability to the role of social networks (Hatziprokopiou 2006:122). The Soviet Greeks have considerably higher levels of house ownership due to their favourable status and the state loans they received. Thus, their residential choices are also influenced by the availability of cheap apartments for sale or "opportunities" to build their own housing, as it will be described in more detail in the next section. Their dispersion over the city follows a considerably different pattern from the Albanian community, which is comparable in size (map D3).

Map D3: Dispersion of selected migrant groups







D.3. Patterns of segregation and exposure

D.3.1. Immigrants' residential concentrations in Thessaloniki


Immigrants' concentrations at the Municipal level in Greater Thessaloniki range from approximately 4% to slightly more than 20% and most Municipalities host an immigrant population close to Greater Thessaloniki's average. The highest concentration levels are located in the municipalities of Efkarpia (15), Eleftherio Kordelio (4) and Thermaikos (24). In the former two, the high number of immigrants should be primarily attributed to significant concentrations of Soviet Greeks, whereas the seaside suburb of Thermaikos hosts a considerably more multiethnic population. Eight out of nine municipalities with the highest immigrant concentrations are situated in the West parts of the Conurbation and the Peri Urban Zone and only Thermaikos is situated at the South-East. The presence of immigrants in the central Municipality of Thessaloniki appears only slightly higher than the GTA average. Here, the spatial scale of our map constitutes a problem, since it hides significant concentrations within certain districts of the Municipality, which would have been revealed if we had mapped immigrant concentrations at a finer scale. These, as well as the distinct spatial patterns of each immigrant group are discussed below.

In order to identify immigrants' concentrations in the city accurately, we would have to map immigrant population rates at the level of the smallest available spatial unit, i.e. Census tracts. As explained in Part B, although information at the Census tracts levels was available unfortunately mapping at this scale proved to be impossible. Thus, the cartography of concentrations is done at the Municipal level. Indeed, the spatial scale of our maps may appear problematic since it refers to extremely heterogeneous spatial entities in terms of

population, but also territory. More importantly, as it is already mentioned it “masks” ethnic concentrations that might exist at a finer scale or are found at the borders of Municipalities.

To counter the first problem and to be able to draw comparisons between the groups we mapped the distribution of Location Quotients (LQ), a common and easy-to-interpret measure of relative concentrations. LQ measures over-or-under representation comparing two concentrations of a subgroup: in our case these refer to the subgroup’s concentration in Municipality, compared to the subgroup’s concentration in the entire study area, that is the GTA²¹. As for the second problem we looked at the immigrant group’s rates at Census tracks to spot the neighbourhoods with the highest immigrant population across Greater Thessaloniki. Especially, for the Conurbation²² we could use some more detailed maps compiled by Kokkali (forthcoming). Those maps, which give us further and finer information about four of our immigrant groups, are also based on the data of the 2001 Census. They present the concentration of the major non-Greek immigrant groups in the geographical entities delimited by Postal Codes²³. Those maps were particularly helpful to spot immigrants concentrations at the central and largest Municipality of Thessaloniki.

Map D4: Migrants’ concentrations in Greater Thessaloniki’s Municipalities



²¹ Location Quotient (LQ) values near 1 signify that in the spatial entity concerned the population in question has a distribution similar to the average in the entire study area. Values more than 1 indicate higher concentrations and values less than 1 signify lower ones.

²² The maps do not present the distribution for the whole Conurbation since they do not include information about Eykarpia, Polihni, Triandria and Panorama.

²³ Except from the large municipalities like that of Thessaloniki, which are cut out in several sectors with different Postal Codes, the smaller ones are presented by one or few postal codes. Yet postal codes do not coincide absolutely with the municipalities’ borders. Because of that and due to the fact the reference area is different (GTA for our study and the Conurbation for those maps) LQ levels appear slightly different for similar areas. Finally it is to be noted that the colours and the ranges in Kokkali’s maps do not coincide completely with the ones in the maps presented here.

Soviet Greeks

Soviet Greeks may have been the most influential group in the production of new geographies on the urban landscape of Thessaloniki and their presence has led to the transformation of Greater Thessaloniki to a considerable degree (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2008). This is partly an outcome of the size of their community but it also relates to their different status²⁴ and their history of migration. Soviet Greeks immigrated to Greece permanently and most came in groups of related families, transplanting part of their old social networks to Greece, their “new” albeit “true” home. Their presence was quite visible in the city’s in the public space from the very beginning²⁵ and gradually so through entrepreneurship (Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2008; *forthcoming*) and the formation of compact Soviet Greek neighborhoods (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2006; 2008, Pratsinakis *forthcoming*).


Soviet Greeks immigration to Greece was to a large extent an one-way journey especially for those of Georgian background, who comprise the majority of the Soviet Greek population in the city; getting the Greek citizenship implied losing their Georgian nationality. The need to acquire their own housing, like the majority of native Greeks, and to root in the country was strong. The Greek State was eager to help them in that respect especially due to its inefficiency to provide any substantial help in the labour market. After a failing policy which promoted their placement in the province of Thrace, home to the Muslim minority, and a rural settlement plan that followed, the majority of them immigrated to the cities - notably to Thessaloniki. There they eventually managed to materialise their aspiration to own a house through two distinct ways: self-generated unauthorized construction (*afthereta*) and the acquisition of housing loans. In both cases the State played an important role: in the first case by simply turning a blind eye (reproducing decade-old practices) and in the second case through the distribution of housing loans of 60.000 euros per family for a period of four years (2001-2005).

The first process concluded in the creation of completely segregated unauthorized settlements at the northwest margins of the Conurbation within or close to industrial zones. Katsavounidou & Kourti (2008) mention two of such neighborhoods, Euxinoupoli and Galini in the municipalities of Efkarpiia and Oreokastro respectively, but there is at least one more, Filothei at the north of Efkarpiia municipality. On the other hand the prescription of the loans also led Soviet Greek to the Western part of the City. The amount of 60,000 euros is rather small and they had to search for apartments in the urban zone with the lowest property prices, which is the west districts of the Conurbation (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2008: 67). After the prescription of the loans, the high demand of Soviet Greeks for cheap apartments triggered the economic interest of construction companies which, in cases sponsored by local municipalities, built entire neighbourhoods in the West of Conurbation (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2008: 67). In those neighbourhoods, native Greeks and other immigrants are not excluded but Soviet Greeks constitute the majority population.

²⁴ As described in the first chapter they were given citizenship rights as a welcoming gesture in contrast to other immigrants.

²⁵ Let us refer to the Soviet Greek open markets during the early years of migration and their “appropriation” of the public space in and around Dikastiriou square at the center of the city, which still serves as the heart of the Soviet Greek communities in Thessaloniki and is currently characterised by their mushrooming ethnic businesses (e.g. Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2008; *forthcoming*).

Map D5: Location Quotients for Soviet Greeks in Greater Thessaloniki.




Map D5 clearly shows the high concentrations of Soviet Greeks in the Western part of the Conurbation in 2001; more than 50% of their total population in Greater Thessaloniki lives there. A mapping of the current situation is expected to present even more intense concentrations in the West districts of the Conurbation since the large number of Soviet Greeks who bought apartment with the state housing loans moved to this area. Especially if mapping is done at a finer scale, this will reveal extremely high concentrations locally. Here it should be noted that besides the structural reasons that eventually attracted Soviet Greeks in the Western part of the city, reference is also made to the role common Pontic origin with local western district residents might have played in this respect. However, the degree to which local Pontians, descendants of refugees who fled Asia Minor after 1922, offered support and attracted Soviet Greeks to the Western districts still needs to be explored. Finally, sizeable concentrations are also found in the western part of the Peri-Urban Zone as well as in Thermaikos and Mihaniona in its east. In the remaining Municipalities Soviet Greeks are rather underrepresented.

Albanians

Albanian immigrants and Soviet Greeks constitute almost two thirds of the immigrant population in Thessaloniki and together they determine to a large extent the general immigrant pattern of residential location. On the one hand, Soviet Greeks explain the high concentrations at western districts of the conurbation; on the other, Albanians appear to share residential space with Greeks and their tendency to spread across the urban tissue contributes to overall low segregation levels in Thessaloniki. As seen in map D6, Albanians

are impressively dispersed all over the city with a comparatively strong presence at the periphery due to their labour market “specializations” in the construction and agriculture sectors. Both characteristics of Albanian residential locations have been confirmed by empirical studies (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Hatziprokopiou 2006) and also hold for the case of Athens (Arapoglou 2006; Maloutas 2007). Even within the Conurbation, Albanians appear still rather widespread. They are indeed more concentrated at the Western part of the Municipality of Thessaloniki but it is only in one small area where they have a significant concentration (LQ>4).

Map D6: Location Quotients for Albanians in Greater Thessaloniki and the Conurbation.



Although their dispersion over the city can be partly explained by their large numbers, the lack of important concentrations renders this explanation insufficient (Kokkali *forthcoming*). Except from their residential dispersion Albanians also do not inhibit an ethnic visibility in the city (Pratsinakis *forthcoming*). Entrepreneurship among Albanians, which is at extremely low levels and primarily concerns self-employment, is mostly addressed to Greeks and businesses are widely dispersed across the city (Labrianidis & Hatziprokopiou 2008 *forthcoming*). A comparison between Albanians and Soviet Greeks brings forward a paradox; the immigrant group which is by definition the closest to the ethnonational core appears the most separate and “different” at the local level, whereas the most stigmatised group, Albanians, seems rather assimilated (Pratsinakis *forthcoming*). Conscious about the negative implications of ethnic visibility Albanian immigrants have generally followed strategies to conceal their ethno cultural difference, which distinguishes them from Greeks (Pratsinakis 2005; *forthcoming*; Hatziprokopiou 2003; 2006). Those strategies of ethnic invisibility were both at the personal as well as the collective level. Despite the formation of associations formed to represent the entire community, Albanians have not developed a coherent community but they are organised in fragmented kin-based or regional-origin groups which are loosely interconnected. That is also clearly mirrored in their residential patterns; they do not form concentrations in the city yet prefer to live in small distance from relatives.




Georgians and other former Soviet Union immigrants

As illustrated in the following maps (D7) Immigrants from the former Soviet Union have a very similar pattern of residential location with Soviet Greeks and actually these maps picture the relationship between those two communities. Especially the map excluding the Georgians is almost identical to that of Soviet Greeks. Although immigrants from former Soviet countries with or without Greek decent occupied a common space in the city during the first years of migration that gradually becomes less so the case due to the different status of the two communities and the different opportunities for settlement that arose (e.g. the state loans that benefited ethnic Greeks). As described above, Soviet Greeks tend to cluster in the newly generated Soviet Greek neighborhoods whereas non-Greek descent immigrants from these same countries continue to stay in rented housing with a major concentration at the north-west part of the city-center in Thessaloniki Municipality itself: an old, dense part of the city with low-quality housing and cheap rents, which is gradually emptied of the indigenous population. This area except, from hosting a large numbers of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, serves also as the center of the community with many ethnic businesses of Soviet Greek ownership around Dikastiriou square, which has become a major meeting place for both ethnic Greek and other immigrants from the ex USSR. Another place with a considerable concentration of former Soviet Union immigrants is Thermaikos at the east part of the Peri Urban Zone.

Map D7: Location Quotients for ex USSR migrants and selected groups in the Conurbation.



GTA: ex Soviet Union Migrants (excl. Georgians), LQs

CON*: above: Armenians LQs
below: Russians' LQs



GTA: Georgians' LQs

CON*: Georgians' LQs




* Source: Kokali (forthcoming)

East Europeans, Westerners and others

As pictured in the map D8 East Europeans shows a strong presence in the West part of the Greater Area of Thessaloniki (map E 3.6). It is remarkable that 25% of the total Bulgarian population, which is the major nationality in this group lives in the Municipality of Kallithea. Bulgarians are also concentrated at the northwest part of the Municipality of Thessaloniki as evident in the Kokkali's detailed map below: this area is crucially close to the railway and coach stations that link Thessaloniki to the Balkans. But apart from these overt western concentrations, owing to work availability in factories, workshops and intensive agriculture combined with the role of social networks, this group presents a fairly scattered residential pattern. This later may be explained partly also by the composition of this group, which includes a significant share of middle and highly skilled professionals (e.g. sportsmen, artists, doctors, businessmen) as well as spouses of Greek citizens (see Hatziprokopiou 2006 on Bulgarians). In addition, it also includes people of Greek origin (such as the Bulgarian Sarakatsani, or second generation Greek civil war political refugees), who arrived in small numbers and have been subjected to differentiated legal approaches. The relative concentrations to the eastern suburbs might be attributed to relatively cheaper rents and the availability of work. This is partly the case of ethnic Greek (Sarakatsani) Bulgarians in middle-class Thermo who formed a "cluster" apparently developed through a combination of work-opportunities (in construction, domestic service, but also small-scale manufacturing, etc) and social networks (Hatziprokopiou 2006: ch.7).

Map D8: Location Quotients for East Europeans in the GTA and Bulgarians in the Conurbation




Interestingly, the group of Westerners presents a completely inverted pattern of residential location. They have a strong presence at the eastern GTA, especially at the southeast part of the Conurbation (central Triandria, but most notably the affluent municipality of Panorama)


and the Peri-Urban Zone (seaside Thermaikos) and they are underrepresented in the remaining part of the city (map D9). Those maps point to the significance of economic and social divisions within the total foreign population. The residential concentrations of Westerners which coincide with the more affluent districts of the GTA reflects their privileged socio-economic position in the urban corpus.

What is rather striking is that the heterogeneous category of “Other immigrants” presents a very similar mode of spatial insertion to that of Westerners. It is only their high concentration in the Central municipality of Thessaloniki, and some presence in a couple of north western municipalities which actually differentiates them from Westerners. There is no single explanation here, apart from the one relating to the inherent diversity of this category. Most of small immigrant communities such as the Nigerians and Chinese are concentrated at the City centre. The high presence in the most expensive residential areas of the city may relate to immigrants working as live in personnel, as in the case of Philippino women in Panorama or refer to an “elite” middle class segment of this highly heterogeneous group. It is worthy reminding however Thermi’s labour market opportunities, Thermaikos’ social and ethnic diversity, and Epanomi’s cheaper rents, which may to an extent lie behind this quite interesting result. And also, most importantly, that we are talking here about a very small section of the migrant population, as the aggregate of migrants in this category do not exceed 2000 people across the GTA.

Map D9: Location Quotients for Western country nationals in Greater Thessaloniki



Map D10: Location Quotients for other migrant groups in Greater Thessaloniki



D.3.2. Patterns of Segregation

Having explained the basic patterns of socio-spatial differentiation in Thessaloniki, i.e. the gap between eastern and western districts, we have kept stressing the city’s social mix, the spread of the middle strata and the relative diffusion of social classes. We have thus insisted on the very moderate inequality patterns upon the urban space, asserting that the presence of immigrants seems to reproduce the east-west pattern of social differentiation, while at the same time reinforcing the social diversity on the urban space. Segregation processes, therefore, at least in the extreme form of ghetto-like situations whereby whole areas become home to one single immigrant group with the parallel displacement of locals and are cut-off the urban tissue, have not so far proved to be the case in the city in the same ways as the international experience suggests. The analysis that proceeded, however, may suggest that at the very local level segregation processes are indeed in place, and appear to be taking at least three major forms. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, as clearly shown in the previous sections confirming what recent studies have found (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2006; 2008), the map of the north-west districts of the Conurbation seem to be radically transformed by the presence of Soviet Greeks, who constitute the majority in certain neighbourhoods at the fringes of the city. Secondly, less evident here due to the spatial scale of the analysis, but nevertheless implied especially if we take into account suburbanisation trends and look at the more detailed level of Census Tracts, the are pockets in the inner-city that are gradually being emptied of the indigenous population and increasingly inhabited by migrants. Thirdly, to obtain a clearer picture one has to consider that immigrants live in condominiums that are vertically differentiated (Leontidou 1990, Maloutas 2007), particularly

in the more dense inner-city districts, with the upper floors containing more spacious and better quality apartments being occupied by native middle and/or upper class residents and the lower floors - generally smaller, darker, more humid, etc - are occupied by immigrants and native lower social strata (Labrianidis & Lyberaki 2001; Hatziprokopiou 2006).

Table D8: Segregation Indices, selected nationalities

$S=0.5*\sum(A_i/A-T_i/T)^*$					
	NATIONALITIES	S1 (T = GTA)	S2 (T = CON)	NATIONALITIES	
1	Chinese	0.48085	0.58452	Soviet Greeks	1
2	Soviet Greeks	0.47320	0.47781	China	2
3	Philippinos	0.45081	0.44563	Philippinos	3
4	Syrians	0.45025	0.44512	Syrians	4
5	Nigerians	0.44581	0.43602	Nigerians	5
6	Cypriots	0.39821	0.40541	Cypriots	6
7	Georgians	0.39323	0.38318	Georgians	7
8	Bulgarians	0.34776	0.35170	Albanians	8
9	Yugoslavians**	0.34388	0.33793	Yugoslavians**	9
10	Russians	0.34246	0.33605	Russians	10
11	Armenians	0.34179	0.33455	Armenians	11
12	Albanians	0.34055	0.32441	Turkish	12
13	Turkish	0.33515	0.31896	Americans (US)	13
14	Americans (US)	0.32141	0.31128	British (UK)	14
15	British (UK)	0.31886	0.29842	Bulgarians	15

Notes: * Calculations based on Census Tracts; ** Yugoslavia = Serbia & Montenegro

In order to explore in more detail these emerging segregation patterns in the city, and to look at what dynamics are in place regarding specific migrant groups, we have calculated segregation indices for a number of selected groups, illustrated in Table D7. It should be noted that calculations are based on Census tracts, thus measuring levels of segregation with a finer accuracy and presenting higher values than if they would have been compiled using municipalities. Also, we have calculate segregation indices twice: one by taking Greater Thessaloniki as the wider spatial entity, and another based on the Conurbation only.

Accordingly, as the Table shows, despite the overall picture earlier discussed, the results of segregation indices reach high values for certain small population groups and for Soviet Greeks. The former case is indicating a mosaic of small ethnic “clusters” of groups which were present in extremely low numbers in 2001, such as: the Chinese (only 75 people in the GTA, 72 of them in the Conurbation and 62 in Thessaloniki Municipality), Philippinos (182 in the GTA, 90% in the Conurbation, 73% in Thessaloniki), Syrians (154 in the GTA, 80% in the Conurbation, 74% in Thessaloniki) and Nigerians (233 in the GTA, 97% in the Conurbation, 80% in Thessaloniki). Regarding the Chinese and Nigerians in particular, the studies by Labianidis and Hatziprokopiou (2008; forthcoming) noticed a high concentration of ethnic businesses in or close to the areas where they tend to live: namely at the western part of Thessaloniki municipality (between the railway station and the port) in the case of the Chinese, and at the eastern districts bordering the centre (close to the University campus) in the Nigerians’ case.

A major finding is revealed for the segregation patterns of Soviet Greeks, relating to their high concentrations locally in north-western districts. Especially if we look at the Conurbation, the for value for Soviet Greeks reaches as high as 58%, and this would be expected to be even higher after the housing loans of 2001-2005. They constitute the majority population in two Census Tracts in the municipalities of Efkarpia and Ehedoro (Diavata) and are present in large shares (above 20%) in another three: two in Eleftherio-Kordelio and one in Evosmos.

At the same time, the values for larger “communities” like the Albanians, Armenians, Georgians, Turks and especially western-country nationals are low. The case of Bulgarian is somehow peculiar: their segregation index for the GTA is of a moderate value, while for the

Conurbation it is extremely low. This confirms what has been suggested in the previous section with their concentrations in the outer GTA. Except the major concentration in Kallithea Municipality a look at Census tracts reveals certain clustering in Nea Magnisia (Municipality of Ehedoros), mostly people from the Muslim minority of southern Bulgaria working in local greenhouses, and particularly in Thermi, where the Sarakatsani ethnic Greek community are heavily concentrated. Interesting differences at the segregation values within the Conurbation and the GTA are apparent for Albanians too, who appear more “segregated” within the Conurbation, perhaps reflecting their strong presence in Census tracts within the Municipalities of Pylaia to the east, Efkarpia to the northwest, and Thessaloniki itself as already shown in the previous section. Finally it should be noted that “westerners” appear rather evenly distributed with the exception of Cypriots, whose relatively strong presence in central Thessaloniki census tracts and in Triandria, close to the University campus implies that the majority of them are students.



D.4. Social characterisation of places of residence

Having drawn the map of Thessaloniki’s emerging ethnic geography, it may be helpful, before closing this report, to relate the residential patterns of immigrants in the city to some of the social dynamics described back in Part C as well as in the first section of this Chapter. We are only going to give to such examples, looking at the geography of unskilled labour and the geography of unemployment in Greater Thessaloniki. In both these cases, we compare immigrants with the local population as a whole, but look separately at the specific example of Soviet Greeks, who appear to “score higher” in those fields, particularly unemployment, as has already been shown.

The first set of maps (D11) illustrates the residential patterns of people working in unskilled occupations. The part of the map in greyscale concerns the total population and clearly confirms the east-west patterns of social differentiation in the city: Thessaloniki’s unskilled workers, including a proportion of petit-entrepreneurs, are residentially concentrated in the north-western municipalities of the Conurbation and the industrial zone, while the darker areas in outer GTA are mostly indicative of people employed in agriculture and sectors which may be described as “traditional”. This pattern is followed only moderately by immigrants, although a good share of them work indeed in unskilled jobs, as we have seen. But as the green circles indicate, it seems that the higher concentrations of unskilled migrant workers are to be found exactly in those peripheral municipalities with more traditional job markets. This is not exactly the case of one looks separately at Soviet Greeks, in which case the geography of unskilled workers appears to follow more or less their residential concentrations, i.e. strong presence at the northwest Conurbation (we remind that their educational levels are higher even than those of the naïve population).



On the other hand, as shown on the second set of maps (D12), the concentrations of unemployed immigrants follow more or less the geography of unemployment among the general population. Interestingly, however, although there are significant concentrations within the north-western districts of the Conurbation, the higher ones are not necessarily found within the municipalities where unemployment is most severe, particularly the outer GTA municipality of Halastra, and the inner districts of Ambelokipoi, Menemeni and especially Efkarpia where overall unemployment exceeds 16%. As the second maps depicts, these results take a different twist if we consider unemployed Soviet Greeks, the group most severely experiencing unemployment. In their case, they form higher shares among the unemployed in exactly the areas where unemployment is high, as well as in general. What is even more striking is that their proportion is sharply high even in areas where they are present in small numbers and very low shares, such as in Halastra at the west outer GTA, where virtually more than half of the unemployed locally are Soviet Greeks.

Map D11: Immigrants in unskilled occupations and unskilled Soviet Greeks




Note: Unskilled Population= % of unskilled by Municipality; Unskilled migrants= % of unskilled migrants/total migrants by Municipality; Unskilled Soviet Greeks= % of unskilled Soviet Greeks/total Soviet Greeks by Municipality

Map D12: Immigrants' unemployment and unemployed Soviet Greeks



Map D13: High immigrant concentrations and segregated neighbourhoods



Finally, considering the limitations relating to the spatial scale of our analysis, it would be useful to close the report by giving some specific examples in concrete locations in the city and account for their major social characteristics. We present above a map with the major ethnic concentrations in the Greater Area of Thessaloniki. Here, together with the four municipalities having the highest immigrant population rate, we map the West-North part of the city centre and we spot further concentrations existing at a smaller²⁶ geographical level. The oldest “ethnically segregated” area in Thessaloniki is found at the borders of the municipality of Menemeni, in close proximity to the industrial zone in the West part of the Conurbation, right at the major gateway to the city. This area, which is known with the name Dentropotamos, is not an immigrant neighbourhood but a Roma settlement dating from the 1950s. Dentropotamos, which faces severe problems with unemployment and drug trafficking, is clearly the most stigmatised neighbourhood of Thessaloniki.

In the same municipality there is also the neighbourhood of Lahanokipi. This neighbourhood is actually a huge housing structure, with enormous blocks quite exceptional for Greek standards, which hosts a considerable number of Soviet Greeks (Katsavounidou & Kourti 2008: 68). The building project in Lahanokipi has developed at the same time when the housing loans had started to be distributed to Soviet Greeks. During the same period and for the same reasons another area of Thessaloniki experienced a housing boom; Nikopoli which is found at the borders of the Municipality of Stavroupoli and Polixni at the North West of the Conurbation. This is a substantially bigger area hosting more than 7000 people of which approximately 60% are Soviet Greeks, 35% native Greeks and the remaining 5% other immigrants. North of Nikopoli at the borders of the Municipalities of Efkarpia and Evosmos there is Euxinoupoli, a self generated unauthorised Soviet Greek settlement. This is a

²⁶ We were able to spot those neighbourhoods through the analysis of the data set at the Census tracks, our knowledge of the City and the available bibliography on the matter.

completely segregated area within the industrial zone hosting approximately 2500 people. To the North of Efxinoupoli there are two more unauthorised settlements of Soviet Greeks, Galini within the territory of Oreokastro and Filothei in Efkarpia Municipality, significantly smaller than Euxinoupoli in both population and square metres.

Concerning the four municipalities which are presented in the map, we should note that Efkarpia appears as the one with the highest immigrant population simply because it includes two of the aforementioned self generated unauthorised settlements. Eleftherio-Kordelio is also an area which hosts a considerable number of Soviet Greek, as already pointed out. Ehedoros and Thermaikos, on the other hand, concentrate a somewhat more diverse population including significant numbers of Albanian immigrants in particular. In several parts of this report we have noted the “multiethnic” character of the seaside southeastern suburb of Thermaikos, concentrating large numbers not only of Soviet Greeks, Albanian and other immigrant groups, but also of western-country nationals. Yet the areas exhibiting perhaps the greatest diversity lie within the central Municipality of Thessaloniki itself. Particularly the western districts bordering the city centre emerge as rapidly transforming into multiethnic neighbourhoods. This area, which could be described as a major gateway as it is strategically located between the city’s main Coach station, the railway station and the port, concentrates a good number of hotels and is home to Thessaloniki’s emerging “Chinatown”, as well as open markets and piazzas where immigrants gather in search for casual employment. Historically an entry-point to the city, once in(famous) for the notorious “Bara”, one of the largest red light districts in Eastern Europe (e.g. see Mazower 2004) and still a major location for the city’s sex-trade, it is characterised by a highly mixed land use and hosts a diverse range of economic activities. Still offering cheap rents for an area as close to downtown Thessaloniki, it is marked by immigrant concentrations exceeding 30% and currently undergoing major changes relating to regeneration projects and rapid transformation of its spatial uses.

Part E - Conclusion

Today, Thessaloniki is more open towards the “other”, being more cosmopolitan and internationalized. A considerable number of its residents have previously lived in other countries, while a significant share of Thessaloniki’s population is shaped by either economic refugees or “repatriating” Greeks, who were born in other countries and come to Greece, returning to the country they or their parents left behind, or to an “ancestral homeland” (see Table D1). If one considers Thessaloniki’s history, its transnational links within the Ottoman world, its Sephardic and “multiethnic” past, and its successful albeit painful accommodation of Asia Minor and Pontic refugees in the 1920s-1930s, as well as its difficult pathway to “Hellenisation” and incorporation within the nation-state, its case stands rather exceptional within the migratory landscape of Greece. But a further uniqueness is suggested by the composition of its migrant population at present, as it hosts a considerably less diverse range of migrant groups, with still very significant numbers of Albanians though much lower than in the rest of the country, and particularly high proportion of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union (*homogeneis*), as well as many returning Greeks who have been migrants to various western countries. A key question, therefore, relates to the place and role of immigrants in the city and the impact of their presence in the social, spatial, economic and political dynamics at the local level.

Summarising the major findings discussed in this report, with respect to their key socio-economic characteristics we should highlight the following:

- The migrants’ shares among the city’s economically active population are higher than among Greek nationals, who are characterized by a higher proportion of elderly population age 65 and above. The case of Soviet Greeks slightly differs, as older people among them are still lower than among natives but relatively high owing to their family migration patterns.
- An interesting fact is that both foreign nationals and Soviet Greeks present lower shares of illiterates among their population, compared to Greek nationals. At the same time, migrants in general have an overall good education level, which in the case of Soviet Greeks exceeds that of the natives.
- Despite this, however, migrants’ population in Thessaloniki presents higher shares of unskilled workers when compared to Greek nationals, with the rather obvious exception of ‘westerners’.
- Their overall unemployment levels are more or less comparable to those of Greeks. Soviet Greeks’ unemployment rate, however, is the highest among all migrant groups in Thessaloniki, significantly exceeding the city’s average. This could be partially attributed to the fact that they feel they are back home and, given the high educational background of many, their life and work expectations are higher.

Thus, it could be argued that **migrants** constitute a crucial motive force for Thessaloniki, on the basis of a more dynamic age pyramid, their higher educational levels and their willingness to work under harder conditions than Greek nationals and in jobs that Greeks are increasingly reluctant to do. However, due to specific aspects of the migrants’ surrounding environment (such as the legislative framework concerning their presence in Greece, the structural conditions shaping their labour market integration, or their inability to raise the needed capital to start their own businesses –with the exception of Soviet Greeks), they are not able to boost local entrepreneurial activity, as the data concerning migrants’ occupation status reveal (low shares of employers and self-employed migrants). Even their small business start-ups involve investments in labour-intensive industries, which are unable to provide them with a satisfactory profit margin (see also Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou, 20008).

In conclusion, the presence of a labour force, which is willing/forced to work under unfavourable conditions (low wages, no insurance, unhealthy and unsafe working positions),

has not proved to be enhancing for the economy of Thessaloniki, apart from the profits generated out of their exploitation which might have been important at an earlier stage but they cannot be sustainable in the long run. Local firms, however, continue to focus on low-cost activities in their effort to remain competitive, instead of turning to higher value-added activities.

Turning now to the emerging ethnic geography of Thessaloniki, it became clear enough from our analysis in Part D that immigrants constitute a major force of change. Among our key-findings in terms of their housing and residential patterns, we would like to stress the ones listed below:

- Migrants' share of house-owners is considerably lower than the Greek nationals' one, while the Soviet Greeks' respective figure is between them. In general, all migrant groups are living in worse conditions compared to Greeks, since the percentage of people living in properties of less than 15 sq. m. is considerably higher, while the share of those living in spaces of more than 40 sq. m. is significantly lower. It is worth mentioning that lower figures in the case of the latter group could be explained by the higher shares of owners among them. Almost half of them decided to own a house, which inevitably led them to worse living conditions, bearing in mind their spatial concentration in the areas of western districts of Thessaloniki.
- Regarding the location of workplace, some interesting facts were also evident, notably the high shares of immigrants working within the boundaries of their municipalities of residence, particularly high among Albanians.
- Migrants in Thessaloniki reproduce the 'classic' division of the city between the *western* (e.g. over-representation of migrants in Municipalities such as Abelokipoi and Eleftherio-Kordelio) and the *eastern* (e.g. lower percentages of migrants in Kalamaria and Panorama) districts. The latter districts attract more 'westerners' and 'others'.
- **Albanians seem to be the exception of the rule, due to their relatively equable distribution in the city.** This could be explained through the examination of their rationale concerning residence location. Specifically, **cheap rents** are their major criterion for residence location and, thus, they have been able to find a house almost everywhere across the city. It is interesting to note that they are living even in eastern districts, such as Panorama, where they were able to utilize a significant share of housing-stock, which was previously unexploited.

Amidst ongoing suburbanisation and processes of transformation of the urban space, including its demographics, cityscape and its social and economic uses, the presence of immigrants seem to reproduce the east-west pattern of social differentiation while at the same time enforcing its relative social mix, particularly in the inner-city districts. These contradictory forces owe largely to the impact of the two most numerous migrant groups in the city, present in more or less equal numbers and both among the "oldest" migrant groups: namely Albanians and Soviet Greeks.

- **The former are resent in high shares, though significantly lower than virtually any other place in Greece, including Athens.** As in the rest of the country though, they: (a) *followed a more "standard" migratory path* (with single young men leading the way and women and families following at a later stage); (b) *have been largely undocumented throughout the 1990s* (with the exception of ethnic Greeks among them, the majority started getting regularised towards the end of that decade); (c) *they have been highly stigmatised* and remain very much so; (d) their *employment patterns* dependent on their willingness to accept *any type of job*, often in harsh conditions (but many among them experienced upward socio-economic mobility (Labrianidis & Lyberaki, 2001; Lyberaki & Maroukis, 2005; Hatzirpokopiou, 2006)). In terms of their socio-spatial integration, as we have seen, they have followed a very diffused path of wide dispersion across the city and **they are perhaps the major group enhancing the city's relative social mix.** Given their ambivalent and still

temporary legal status, however, they have no political rights and are therefore unlikely to impact politically the local dynamics.

- **The latter are present in higher shares here and hence constitute a decisive factor of Thessaloniki's differentiation from the rest of the country.** They differ on a basis of: (a) *dissimilar demographic characteristics* (i.e. higher share of population age 65 and above); (b) *special accession procedures* (they can easily acquire the Greek citizenship); (c) *patterns of employment* (they are not willing to work anywhere) and (d) *housing* (they can have their own house, as a result of the concessive loan terms). However, some of these aspects led them to worse living conditions: almost 1/3 of them live in housing spaces of less than 15 sq. m., while they are spatially concentrated in the more "down-market" western districts of the city. This could be attributed to the fact that they settled in Greece in extended household groups, while their habitation paths are also determined by the previous presence of relatives there (see also Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace, 2000, p.27). But what it generally shows, considering also their high rates of unemployment for instance, is that **this is the major group reproducing the "working class" or "socially disadvantaged" character of north-western districts**, particularly within the Conurbation (as maintained by Katsavounidou & Kourti 2008). Without any intension to speculate on possibilities little supported by facts, they are likely to generally adopt at an initial stage a more conservative electoral behaviour, owing not simply to national(istic) considerations underpinning their migratory trajectories, but the exploitation of these, as well as of the practicalities of their settlement and integration, by populist politicians and the development of a new set of clientalist political relations.

Thessaloniki, just like every other city, goes through the phases of the business or economic cycle. Thus, there are periods of stagnation and decline (Thessaloniki's economy has entered this phase since 1990) not only in economic terms, but in terms of the intellectual capital and the remaining motive forces, which become less creative. Even though this is a common and –somehow- ineluctable phenomenon, failing to plan and execute a survival strategy constitutes the crucial problem.

Fluctuations and economic decline, as well as the rising unemployment did not impose a systematic effort to undertake new initiatives and enhance the city's exit from this phase. However, it is the city's peculiarities and distinct characteristics that should be employed in order to enter a growth period, aiming at strengthening Thessaloniki's role on national and international level. Advantages should be created in order to attract the high-skilled labour force (what could be called the 'talents' (Florida, 2002)); something that on the one hand is not evident today and on the other hand is hindered by the less well off categories of migrants that Greece attracts. Even more, these advantages could be created by firms investing on products and services of higher added value.

On the contrary, the basic argument here is that conservatism has dominated in the most critical fields, such as:

- the *economic*, where low cost strategies were implemented, instead of shift towards strategies of differentiation through innovative products and services, based either upon the cheap labour force of migrants or on the firms' relocation, mainly to the Balkan area, once more in search of the lower cost (Labrianidis & Kalogerisis, 2008). The migrants' work experiences suggest that the availability of their (cheap and flexible) labour provided an excuse allowing employers to maintain profits by cutting labour costs and delaying modernisation. This may have "worked" up to recently but it does not much the relatively high educational profile of the migrants, who - once they have their status legalised and their settlement patterns moving towards longer term plans - will be competing in the labour market in more or less equal terms with Greeks. As the case of Soviet Greeks exemplifies, this may imply rising unemployment among them which has not be largely the case so far at least not in long term. And of course the question of second generation, just coming "into play",

graduating from local schools may suggest a painful twist in the coming years. So the present situation could possibly hinder Thessaloniki's efforts overcome its crisis and find its way towards a path of economic restructuring (Labrianidis, 2008).

- b) *political/social*, where conservative views were primarily expressed and negligible tolerance towards the 'other' was evident. This is not simply a case for migrants only, but affects the city as whole as it is umbilically linked with what we have described above as economic conservatism. It implies "closeness" and "introvert" views about the city's identity dominating the public discourse and the local authorities approach to a number of issues, including immigration, which contradicts the "openness" imposed by the reality. Needless to say that the city's longstanding conservative rule at all levels of regional and local authority, involving populist politicians playing the xenophobe card, is directly related to the political/social stances towards immigrants – as pointed out for instance by local pro-migrant antiracist campaigners (Glarnetatzis, 2001). One should for instance recall in that respect the high-achieving Albanian student in the suburb of Mihaniona who was denied the custom to lead the school parade holding the Greek flag back in the late 1990s, a rather exemplary case that generated endless talks in the media of "who is a Greek" (Kapllani & Mai, 2005). Thus, one can argue that the vicious cycle is further strengthened.

It is necessary to note that the argument mentioned above, concerning the conservatism of the city, shapes, in essence, one of our major research hypotheses to be tested during the fieldwork.

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