

## **City report Rotterdam**

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
### **1. The city in context**

#### *Migration to the Netherlands*

The Netherlands was a 'reluctant country of immigration' for decades (WRR, 2001). Although the Netherlands has had a positive immigration surplus in most years since the early 1960s, the Dutch authorities never acknowledged it had become a country of immigration. Immigration was always seen as a temporary phenomenon, related to specific historical or economic development (the independence of former colonies, the need for low-skilled workers by Dutch industries, the fall of the iron curtain in Europe and after that the wars in former Yugoslavia). However, meanwhile it became clear that large numbers of immigrants from both other EU and other Western countries and from non-Western countries arrived and settled in the country. We start this city report about immigrants in the Dutch city of Rotterdam with a short overview of migration to and from the Netherlands, and of the size of the immigrant population and their offspring living in the Netherlands.

Figure 1 shows the number of individuals, both Dutch nationals and non-nationals, migrating to and from the Netherlands from 1980 until 2006. The figure shows that migration to the Netherlands was at its height in the years of the Millennium Change. In the years 2000 and 2001, the Netherlands received more than 130,000 immigrants annually. Three quarters of them were non-nationals. However, in the following years immigration to the Netherlands dropped to a level of around 90,000 in 2004 and 2005, and increased again to a little more than 100,000 in 2006. May be more remarkable, in the same years the number of individuals emigrating from the Netherlands increased. As a result, the positive migration surplus to the Netherlands or around 60,000 individuals in the years 2000 and 2001 dropped to a level of around 10,000 in 2005 and 2006. When taking so-called 'administrative corrections' (related to unreported emigration of foreigners) into account, the Netherlands even had a negative migration surplus in all years since 2003 (Snel et al. 2006; De Boom et al. 2007).

**Figure 1 Immigration and emigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals to and from the Netherlands and migration surplus (1980-2006, selected years) (in absolute numbers)**



**Source: De Boom et al. (2007 : 30)**

*Who are the immigrants in the Netherlands?*

Before presenting statistical data about the size of the main migrant groups in the Netherlands, we first have to explain how the Dutch authorities count migrants. In fact, the Dutch definitions of ‘who is an immigrant?’ differ greatly from the definitions used in other countries. The Dutch (statistical) authorities normally do not consider immigrants as non-nationals. The reason is that many people with an immigrant background have obtained Dutch citizenship and would therefore not be counted when we limit ourselves to non-Dutch nationals residing in the Netherlands. Another possible approach would be to describe the immigrant population as all foreign-born residents, but this definitions also has its limitations. On the one hand, foreign-born children from Dutch parents would be counted as ‘immigrants’ and on the other hand, children of migrants born in the Netherlands (the so-called second generation) would be excluded. However, within the framework of their immigrant integration policies (that will be outlined later on) the Dutch authorities want to keep track of these second-generation migrants as well. For all these reasons, the official Dutch definition of immigrants – official Dutch publications use the phrase ‘allochtonous’ – include both foreign-born immigrants and their offspring. Anyone born outside the Netherlands with at least one foreign-born parent and anyone born in the Netherlands with at least one foreign-born parent is counted as a ‘allochtonous’ (first and second-generation

immigrants). Since the Dutch statistical authorities also use this definition of immigrants ('allochtonous') and hardly provide any other data we have to stick to this definition in this city report as well, whether we like it or not (*cf.* Snel et al. 2006; De Boom et al. 2007).

Table 1 shows that it makes a great difference what definition is used to describe the non-Dutch population. The table also shows what the main migrant groups are in the Dutch context. When we consider only non-nationals as immigrants, the non-Dutch population residing in the Netherlands is quite small (only 4.2% of the total population). When we consider all foreign-born residents as immigrants, the non-Dutch is larger (10.6% of the total population). When using the official definition of 'allochtonous' (first and second-generation immigrants), not less than 19.4% of the total Dutch population is considered as immigrants and their offspring (including Dutch nationals from the Dutch Antilles). Almost half of all non-native Dutch residents come from other EU-countries and other Western countries (8.8 percent of the total Dutch population). In fact, Germans appear to be the largest non-native group in the Netherlands (many of them are in fact children with one German parent). 5% of the total Dutch population originates from other EU-countries, including the new EU-countries such as Poland. Another 3.7 percent of the total Dutch population comes from other European countries (a relatively large groups from former Yugoslavia) or from other Western countries (including ironically Japan).

Somewhat more than 10% of the total Dutch population are migrants and their offspring coming from non-Western countries. The largest non-Western migrant groups are the Turks (368.6 thousand), Surinamese (333.5 thousand), Moroccans (329.5 thousand), and Antilleans (130 thousand, basically all Dutch nationals!). Table 1 also shows a large group of 'Indonesians' (here also defined as a Western country!). These are mainly Dutch individuals born in Indonesia before its independence in 1948. These main non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands clearly show how immigration to the Netherlands is related to major events in the Dutch economic history: on the one hand with former colonies that now became independent from the Netherlands and on the other hand the history of recruitment of low-skilled 'guest workers' from the Mediterranean area. For a long time, these four immigrant groups or 'ethnic minorities' dominated migration to the Netherlands. However, since the late 1980s when many asylum seekers arrived in the Netherlands the immigrant or minority population in the Netherlands became much more fragmented. Immigrants nowadays come from all countries in the world, including those countries the Netherlands has no historical ties with (such as China, Iraq and the former Soviet Union).

**Table 1. Dutch and non-Dutch residents in the Netherlands by citizenship, place of birth and 'ethnic origin' (2007)**

	Foreign nationals		Foreign-born (first generation)		Ethnic origin (first and second generation)	
	number	percentage	number	percentage	number	percentage
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.357.992</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>16.357.992</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>16.357.992</b>	<b>100,0</b>
<b>Dutch</b>	<b>15.676.060</b>	<b>95,8</b>	<b>14.625.613</b>	<b>89,4</b>	<b>13.187.586</b>	<b>80,6</b>
<b>Non-Dutch</b>	<b>681.932</b>	<b>4,2</b>	<b>1.732.379</b>	<b>10,6</b>	<b>3.170.406</b>	<b>19,4</b>
<i>from</i>						
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>308.213</b>	<b>1,9</b>	<b>666.112</b>	<b>4,1</b>	<b>1.431.954</b>	<b>8,8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>old EU countries (15)</b>	<b>210.877</b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>306.580</b>	<b>1,9</b>	<b>740.836</b>	<b>4,5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Germany	60.201	0,4	116.387	0,7	381.186	2,3
United Kingdom	40.335	0,2	45.797	0,3	75.686	0,5
Belgium	25.999	0,2	47.372	0,3	112.224	0,7
<b>new EU countries (10)</b>	<b>28.564</b>	<b>0,2</b>	<b>48.849</b>	<b>0,3</b>	<b>79.682</b>	<b>0,5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Poland	19.645	0,1	35.313	0,2	51.339	0,3
Hungary	2.386	0,0	5.850	0,0	12.931	0,1
Czechoslovakia (former)	3.933	0,0	7.116	0,0	11.495	0,1
<b>Other Europe</b>	<b>29.607</b>	<b>0,2</b>	<b>109.158</b>	<b>0,7</b>	<b>150.124</b>	<b>0,9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Yugoslavia (former)	9.661	0,1	52.965	0,3	76.465	0,5
Soviet Union (former)	9.824	0,1	36.034	0,2	47.450	0,3
<b>other Western Countries</b>	<b>39.165</b>	<b>0,2</b>	<b>201.525</b>	<b>1,2</b>	<b>461.312</b>	<b>2,8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
United States	14.641	0,1	23.028	0,1	31.154	0,2
Canada	3.324	0,0	8.839	0,1	13.160	0,1
Australia	3.179	0,0	9.978	0,1	14.526	0,1
Indonesia	11.389	0,1	149.652	0,9	389.940	2,4
Japan	5.736	0,0	6.103	0,0	7.347	0,0
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>284.451</b>	<b>1,7</b>	<b>1.066.267</b>	<b>6,5</b>	<b>1.738.452</b>	<b>10,6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Turkey	96.779	0,6	195.379	1,2	368.600	2,3
Morocco	80.518	0,5	168.008	1,0	329.493	2,0
Somalia	1.175	0,0	12.969	0,1	18.918	0,1
South Africa	2.865	0,0	12.176	0,1	15.718	0,1
Ghana	4.632	0,0	12.305	0,1	19.437	0,1
Cape Verde	1.466	0,0	11.449	0,1	20.181	0,1
Egypt	2.729	0,0	11.251	0,1	19.266	0,1
Ethiopia	1.256	0,0	8.036	0,0	10.454	0,1
Angola	746	0,0	7.046	0,0	9.459	0,1
Suriname	7.561	0,0	187.768	1,1	333.504	2,0
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	0	0,0	86.257	0,5	129.965	0,8
Colombia	2.063	0,0	12.122	0,1	10.631	0,1
Brazil	4.209	0,0	11.335	0,1	13.964	0,1
Iraq	3.628	0,0	34.784	0,2	43.891	0,3
Afghanistan	3.810	0,0	31.344	0,2	37.230	0,2
China	15.266	0,1	35.476	0,2	45.298	0,3
Iran	2.695	0,0	23.762	0,1	28.969	0,2
India	5.381	0,0	13.760	0,1	16.027	0,1
Vietnam	2.623	0,0	12.115	0,1	18.441	0,1
Pakistan	3.042	0,0	11.124	0,1	18.374	0,1
Hongkong	0	0,0	10.299	0,1	18.106	0,1
Sri Lanka	1.474	0,0	9.798	0,1	9.612	0,1
Philippines	3.280	0,0	9.242	0,1	14.019	0,1
Thailand	5.504	0,0	10.687	0,1	13.760	0,1
unknown/stateless	89.268					

**Source: De Boom et al. (2007)**

*Public climate and immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands (2002-2006)*

No doubt the most important political event in the Netherlands in the last decade was the unexpected rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and his assassination shortly before the national elections in 2002. Pim Fortuyn's sudden popularity shows a major change in the Dutch public opinion climate especially as issues of migration and immigrant integration are concerned. Despite his death, Pim Fortuyn's political party (LPF) had a landslide victory in the national elections of 2002. As later electoral research shows, what all LPF voters had in common were their doubts or outright criticisms about ongoing immigration and the rising multicultural society in the Netherlands (Van der Brug 2003; Wansink 2004). Political commentators now refer to this chain of events as the 'citizens revolt' against the Dutch political elite and their idea of an open-minded (?) multicultural society. Two years later, in 2004, the Netherlands was again shocked by a brutal political murder. Up to then, such political violence was basically unknown in Dutch politics. This time the victim was Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker and fierce critic of Islam, who was murdered by an Islamic fundamentalist (Mohammed B.). And in between all these incidents the Dutch shocked the international public opinion with their vote against the EU Constitution in 2005. The common thread between all events these is the growing aversion against immigration and multiculturalism in the Dutch public opinion. Also the vote against Europe was partly inspired by the fear for mass immigration from Eastern Europe and for the possible entry of Turkey to the EU. This sudden change in the public opinion climate was all the more striking, as the Dutch were always known for their multicultural tolerance.

Of course, Dutch politics and policy-making could not neglect this public aversion against ongoing immigration and multicultural society in general – the 'multicultural backlash' as Grillo (2004) calls it. As Vasta (2008: 714) observes in a recent analysis of the Dutch political debate, there was "...an extreme turn on integration policy, fuelled by an public outcry that immigrants have not met 'their responsibility to integrate'. Attitudes and policies have moved from rather liberal to a rather narrow and restrictive approach". However, this rather popular image of a radical turn in the Dutch public debate on immigration and integration policies should be commented in at least two ways. Firstly, it is debatable whether the Dutch were really that tolerant vis-à-vis ethnic minorities and cultural diversity. As several authors recently observed the famous Dutch multicultural tolerance may in fact have been more a 'cultus of avoidance' and based on indifference rather than on tolerance. Immigrants could do what they like as long as Dutch are not bothered (De Beus 1998; Scheffer 2007; Schinkel 2007). Secondly, this image of a sudden drastic turn in the Dutch integration policies suggests that the Dutch public opinions and

policies were unchangingly until 2002. This conceals, however, the drastic frame shifts in the Dutch integration policies between 1970 and 2000.

Looking back we could distinguish four successive phases in the Dutch integration policies (*cf.* Engbersen 2003; Entzinger 2003; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Snel 2003; Snel & Scholten 2005; Scholten 2007; Vasta 2007). Here we give a short summary of these paradigmatic changes in the Dutch integration policies. The first phase of the Dutch integration policy (as far as there was any *integration* policy!) lasted until the early 1980s and was characterized by the ‘*myth of return*’. Both the migrant groups involved and the Dutch authorities shared the conviction that most migrants were only temporary here and would return home after having finished their work in Dutch industries. Since the Dutch government wanted to stimulate the return of migrants too much immigrant integration was perceived rather as a problem. Dutch policies stimulated and financed migrants’ social organizations, preservations of migrants’ cultures and mother-tongue education for migrants’ children all in order to facilitate the return of migrants.

The second phase of the Dutch integration policies started in the early 1980s when it became clear that many migrants were here to stay. Instead of returning to their home countries (Turkey, Morocco) many so-called ‘guest workers’ had their families come over to the Netherlands. As a reaction, the Dutch government started new programs more focused on immigrant integration. However, there was no complete break with the previous phase, as ‘preservation of culture’ remained a leading policy objective. This resulted in a multicultural model of integration policies. The idea was that migrant communities could improve their social position in Dutch society while still remaining a separate community with its own culture.

This multicultural policy (at least officially) ended already in the early 1990s when it became clear to Dutch policymakers that the social position of many migrants was rather disastrous (huge unemployment, many poor households, very low educational levels, also among the second generation who grew up in the Netherlands). As a consequence of this new problem definition, Dutch integration policies – in their third phase – got a more universalistic character (Koopmans & Statham 2000). Instead of the multicultural policies of the 1980s, there was now much more emphasis on improving the social position – especially the labour market and educational position – of migrants and their offspring. These new policies were also more demanding for migrant groups, emphasising not only social rights but also the obligation to participate in Dutch society. However, as later critics of the Dutch integration policies made clear, this new integration policy paradigm was hardly followed by new policy measures stimulating the social position of immigrants. There were few actual measures really stimulating

the active participation of migrants in Dutch society migrants (*cf.* Koopmans 2003; Snel & Scholten 2005). A notable exception is, however, the Act Civic Integration Newcomers, issued in 1998 (!), containing obligatory language programs for all newly arrived immigrants (only EU citizens and newcomers with sufficient command of the Dutch language were exempted from this obligatory civic integration).

After 9/11 (2001) and after the dramatic events in Dutch politics in 2002 (the rise and subsequent assassination of Pim Fortuyn and the so-called ‘citizens revolt’ resulting in four years of conservative cabinets in the Netherlands), there was again a dramatic shift in the Dutch integration policies. There was a widespread public and political belief that immigrant integration thus far has failed (Penninx 2006: 249). The conservative government at that time pronounced a ‘integration policy new style’. Commentators noticed more than ever before a turn towards ‘assimilationism’ in the new integration policies (Snel 2003; Snel & Scholten 2005; Penninx, 2006; Scholten, 2007). As the then Minister of Immigration & Integration, Ms. Verdonk, wrote in her letter *Integration policy New Style* (2003):

*“In this (former) Integration policy, a great deal of emphasis has been traditionally put on accepting differences between minorities and the native Dutch population. In itself, there is nothing wrong with that, but it is often misinterpreted to mean the presence of new ethnic groups is a good thing and automatically enriches our society. One loses sight of the fact that not everything that is different is consequently also good. Having newcomers cultivate their own cultural identities does not necessarily bridge any gaps. The unity of society should be sought in what people who take part in it have in common with each other, in what they share”* (our translation, cited in: Snel et al. 2005: 2)

Whereas the Dutch integration policies of the 1990s focused on socio-economic integration, the new policy approach emphasized the necessity of shared norms and values. Integration problems were not primarily defined anymore in terms of social deprivation and social exclusion, but in terms of deviant behaviour (including Muslim radicalism, but also high crime rates of several immigrant groups and nuisance caused by juveniles with an immigrant background, especially in urban neighbourhoods with large immigrant populations) (*cf.* Snel 2003; Snel & Stock, 2008). However, again, a new policy perspective was not translated directly in new policy measures. As Penninx (2006: 248) observes: ‘Policy practice [...] changes less quickly and less pervasively than discourse, so the Netherlands now has a mixed model’.

#### *Local integration policies in Rotterdam*

In the city of Rotterdam, Pim Fortuyn had may be more influence than anywhere else in the Netherlands. Fortuyn lived in Rotterdam, and participated in and convincingly won the local

elections of March 2002. After his tragic death, his Rotterdam political party (called 'Liveable Rotterdam') played a leading role in the new Rotterdam city government that was in office from 2002 until 2006. Fortuyn and Liveable Rotterdam sharply criticized the (in their eyes) bureaucratic and unresponsive style of governing of the then political (social-democratic) establishment in Rotterdam. Ordinary citizens should have a voice in local politics, especially citizens' protests against crime and nuisance in urban neighbourhoods should be heard. The first priority of the new city government with Liveable Rotterdam in a leading role was therefore to restore safety in the city. In the coalition agreement of the new city government, the fight against nuisance and crime was the central issue. The coalition agreement did not contain the expected strict approach to migrants and minorities, although in practice, the new security approach had everything to do with immigrants and integration issues. The problems of law and order were heavily concentrated in the migrant neighbourhoods in Rotterdam and because both perpetrators and victims of crime often have a migrant background.

Three issues in Rotterdam local politics related to immigrants and integration should be mentioned (cf. Snel 2008). The first issue is the population forecast from the Rotterdam statistical agency COS, saying that with unaltered policies the share of ethnic minorities (first and second generation immigrants from non-Western countries) in Rotterdam would rise to over 50 percent in 2017 (Ergün en Bik, 2003). This population forecast caused fierce political debate in Rotterdam, including a Liveable Rotterdam proposal for a complete 'immigrants stop' ("allochtonenstop") in the city. In the end, the Rotterdam local government announced a 'selective settlement policy'. Newcomers in the city were not allowed to settle in certain problematic districts (called 'hot spots') when they were not formally employed. By using a social criterion (being employed) instead of an ethnic criterion (ethnic background) as a condition for settlement in these neighbourhoods, the 'selective settlement policy' is not contrary to existing anti-discrimination laws.

The second issue are the so-called public 'Islam & Integration'-debates, organised by the Rotterdam authorities after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004. The objective of the debate was to promote 'integration and mutual understanding between the various groups living in Rotterdam'. Especially Liveable Rotterdam aldermen took the opportunity to give their vision on the (in their eyes) failed integration of Muslim immigrants. In 2006, as a conclusion of the Islam debates the Rotterdam city council published the so-called Rotterdam code. Particularly the issue of the use of 'Dutch as our common language' ("...in public we speak Dutch – at school, at work, on the street, and in community centres...") caused much public and political commotion (Municipality Rotterdam, 2006: 3.)



Thirdly, the Rotterdam city council observed that the compulsory language and civic integration programs for newcomers that started in 1998 were unsuccessful. Too many participants in the programs dropped out prematurely, newcomers completing the course generally still had a very low command of Dutch language, and the integration courses should focus more on ‘Dutch society [and] behavioural rules’ (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2002). The Rotterdam city council called for a greater effort in civic integration of newly arrived immigrants and also those migrants already living in the city. The Rotterdam city council with Liveable Rotterdam was in office until 2006. After the new local elections the old coalition lead by the Dutch labour party came in office again. However, as is observed, the return to power of the Social Democrats was no return to ‘old politics’. The new local policy approach emphasising public safety and immigrant integration appears to be a more fundamental or paradigmatic ‘regime change’ in Rotterdam local politics. Also the new coalition with the Social Democrats and the Green Party more or less follows the same policy line (Tops, 2007; Snel 2008).

## **2. Political and Administrative structure of Rotterdam**

Rotterdam is one of the four main cities in the Netherlands, the other ones being Amsterdam (capital of the Netherlands), The Hague (where the Dutch government and parliament are located), and Utrecht. With around 600,000 residents, Rotterdam is the second largest Dutch city. Amsterdam is somewhat bigger with almost 700,000 residents. However, the numbers refer only to the numbers of residents living within the municipalities Rotterdam and Amsterdam. As any large European city, both cities are surrounded by a larger urban area that include suburbs, ‘new towns’ that were build in the 1960s and 1970s to receive large numbers of residents from the central cities during these years of mass sub urbanisation, and also more rural settlements. In the Rotterdam city region, which is called Rijnmond, municipalities like Cappelle aan de IJssel and Spijkenisse are typical examples of such ‘new towns’ that developed rapidly during the 1960’s and 1970s.

Rotterdam is one of two main Dutch cities in the province of South-Holland (the other one is The Hague). Provinces like South Holland constitute the second administrative level in the Netherlands, have their own elections and administrative board. City regions like Rijnmond are no independent administrative level in the Netherlands. In the 1990s there were policy intentions to officially create the Rijnmond region as a separate administrative level. However, as this plan basically implicated, as critics said, the ‘abolishment’ of cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, it caused extensive public protest and was eventually rejected after local referendums. ‘Greater

metropolitan areas' or 'city regions' like Rijnmond never became a separate administrative level. But the municipalities belonging to the Rijnmond region cooperate on certain issues and Rijnmond is also a statistical unit.<sup>1</sup> Besides the city of Rotterdam, 14 other municipalities belong to the Rotterdam region: Maassluis, Vlaardingen, Schiedam, Langsingerland, Cappelle a.d. IJssel, Krimpen a.d. IJssel, Ridderkerk, Barendrecht, Albrandswaard, Spijkenisse, Bernisse, Hellevoetsluis, Westvoorne, Brielle, and Rozenburg.

Each of these cities has its own elected council (the city council of municipal council) and its own administrative board of a mayor and his or her aldermen. The municipal level is the third administrative level in the Netherlands and is very important since municipalities have a large say in many social and political issues (such as housing, economic development, local traffic, environmental issues, local employment, social assistance, etc.). However, large cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam have an additional fourth administrative level, the city districts ('deelgemeente'). Rotterdam has twelve districts: Rotterdam-Centre, Charles, Delfshaven, Feijenoord, Hillegersberg/Schiebroek, Hoek van Holland, Hoogvliet, IJsselmonde, Kralingen/Crooswijk, Rotterdam-North, Overschie and Prins Alexander. Each city district also has its own elected council and administrative board (the chairperson and 'aldermen' of the district).

On an even lower level there are the Rotterdam neighbourhoods (parishes). Rotterdam has officially 88 different neighbourhoods. However, eleven of them do not belong to any district. They are harbour or industrial areas in Rotterdam, with hardly any residents. The remaining 77 neighbourhoods that do belong to a city district differ substantially in the number of residents. Some neighbourhoods have a population of only a few hundred persons, 28 neighbourhoods house at least 9,000 residents. The three largest Rotterdam neighbourhoods house not less than 20,000 residents. Neighbourhoods are not a separate administrative level. The city district authorities generally administrate neighbourhood developments.

### **3. Social-territorial portrait of Rotterdam**

#### *The city and the region: Rotterdam and Rijnmond*


The four main Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) had their largest populations in the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s the cities experienced a rapid population

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<sup>1</sup> Since the 1970s, the Dutch statistical authorities (Netherlands Statistics) distinguish 40 different regions in the Netherlands, Rijnmond being one of them (in Dutch, these regions are called COROP-areas). Rijnmond is also formally one of the four regions of the province of South Holland

decline. The total number of residents of all four cities together fell from around 2,5 million in the late 1960s to around 2 million in the mid 1980s. After that, the urban populations stabilized more or less.

**Figure 2: Total number of residents of the four main Dutch cities (1951-2000)**



As already mentioned, many residents from cities like Rotterdam moved in the 1960s to the near vicinity, for instance to ‘new towns’ like Cappelle aan de IJssel or Spijkenisse, or to other municipalities in the Rijnmond region. Table 2 gives an overview total population of Rotterdam and the other Rijnmond municipality by ethnic origin.

**Table 2. Residents of Rijnmond municipalities by ethnic origin (2007)**

Municipality	Number of residents	Ethnic composition of the population in %			
		Native Dutch	Non-Western migrants	Western migrants	All migrants
Albrandswaard	21520	86	7	7	14
Barendrecht	43040	84	9	7	16
Bernisse	12670	92	2	6	8
Brielle	15920	89	3	8	11
Capelle aan den IJssel	65370	73	17	10	27
Hellevoetsluis	39630	83	8	9	17
Krimpen aan den IJssel	28720	87	5	8	13
Lansingerland	47930	87	6	7	13
Maassluis	31570	77	16	7	23
Ridderkerk	44680	86	6	8	14
Rotterdam	584060	54	36	10	46
Rozenburg	12680	83	7	10	17
Schiedam	75160	68	24	8	32
Spijkenisse	73880	78	13	9	22
Vlaardingen	71460	77	16	7	23
Westvoorne	14130	91	2	7	9
Total	1.182.420				

Source: Netherlands Statistics, *Kerncijfers wijken en buurten 2007* (our own computation)


In 2007, almost 1.2 million residents lived in the Rotterdam-Rijnmond region. Almost half of the population of the region lived in the city of Rotterdam (584.060 persons). Other larger municipalities in the region are Schiedam, Spijkennisse, and Vlaardingen, all with over 70,000 residents. Cappelle aan de IJssel, a typical middle class suburb in the vicinity of Rotterdam is somewhat smaller (65,000 residents). But the Rijnmond region also contains much smaller, rural municipalities such as Bernisse and Westvoorne (both with less than 15,000 residents). The table also shows the ethnic composition of the population of all Rijnmond municipalities. The table clearly shows that the concentration of individuals with a migrant background (both first and second-generation immigrants) is much higher in the city of Rotterdam (46% of the total population has a migrant background) than in the surrounding cities and suburbs. Schiedam, like Rotterdam an old industrial town, also has a relatively high percentage of first and second-generation immigrants among the population.

#### *Socio-economic characteristics of Rotterdam*

Rotterdam is historically the harbour and industrial city of the Netherlands. For many years, the Rotterdam harbour was the largest harbour in the world. The Rotterdam harbour also housed many industries and as a result Rotterdam attracted many ‘blue collar workers’. In the 1950s and 1960s Rotterdam had a spectacular economic development. The main problem in those

days was the increasing shortage of labour. So-called ‘guest workers were recruited; first from southern Europe, and later from countries like Turkey and Morocco. However, as many old industrial cities, Rotterdam suffered heavily from the economic crises and economic changes of the 1970s and 1980s. The oil crisis, technological developments (especially in communication and transport industries) and globalisation (the competition of low wage countries) caused tremendous job losses in the Rotterdam harbour and industries. Rotterdam’s inner-city neighbourhoods were severely hit by the turn of the economic tide. Not less than 40 percent of the total employment of these neighbourhoods disappeared (Burgers 1999). Up to the 1980s, Dutch cities’ unemployment rates were similar to those in the rest of the country, but after that this changed – and certainly in Rotterdam (figure 3).

**Figure 3. Unemployment rates in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Netherlands (1996-2006)**



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (own computation)

An interesting detail in figure 3 is the difference in unemployment between both Dutch cities. Amsterdam also had to cope with serious job losses and increasing unemployment, but in Rotterdam the development was more disastrous. According to Dutch observers, this difference can be explained by differences in the economic history of both cities. Whereas Rotterdam was always a harbour and industrial city, Amsterdam was for a long time a typical commercial town and also a centre of culture and tourism. Although both cities lost significant harbour and industrial employment, Amsterdam gained more new employment in the service sector. As far as Rotterdam gained new service employment, this was not in the most innovative sectors such as ICT and communication, but especially in public services and education. Also Amsterdam’s hotel, catering and cultural industries provided more employment than in all other Dutch cities together (Kloosterman & Trip, 2004; Burgers & Musterd, 2002; Steijn, Snel et al. 2000). As a result,

Amsterdam was much better able to recover from the process of economic restructuring, and Rotterdam has a more severe problem of persistent unemployment.

### *Outcomes factorial analysis*

On the basis of a multivariate factor analysis of twenty different indicators referring to demographic, socio-economic, and ethnic characteristics of the population of Rotterdam neighbourhoods (only Rotterdam neighbourhoods with at least 100 residents were included in the analysis) five factors were selected with an eigenvalue equal or superior to 1. These five factors together explain 70.5% of the total variance (table 3)

**Table 3. Factor analysis – varimax rotated factor loadings**

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Age < 15 (%)	0,25587	<b>0,88223</b>	0,10167	0,01137	0,10012
Age > 65 (%)	-0,02545	-0,17211	<b>-0,77676</b>	0,12914	-0,17204
persons per household	0,01650	<b>0,96470</b>	0,06812	-0,04394	-0,08777
% single parent families	<b>0,74324</b>	0,46460	0,14967	0,02591	0,14336
% working	<b>-0,82231</b>	0,01858	0,07538	0,31865	-0,07815
% unemployed	<b>0,91234</b>	0,20742	0,10899	-0,16408	0,17312
% on social welfare	<b>0,84675</b>	0,13564	0,01649	-0,34757	0,21386
% high-income households	-0,47852	0,25412	0,12342	0,29742	-0,21798
% low-income households	<b>0,80831</b>	0,12768	0,03408	0,06296	0,13971
% Surinames	0,55307	0,21295	0,29799	0,05371	0,49143
% Antilleans	0,27854	-0,00785	0,12392	0,02171	<b>0,77504</b>
% Cape Verdians	0,51854	0,09421	0,22946	-0,02313	0,01294
% Turks	0,64474	0,18305	0,27160	-0,22981	0,07904
% Moroccans	<b>0,75912</b>	0,12736	0,26859	-0,09884	-0,02791
% Other non-Western migrants	0,33635	-0,30090	0,47491	0,15495	0,41154
% EU and other Western migrants	-0,23037	-0,65002	0,41019	0,32241	-0,07805
% house ownership	<b>-0,89639</b>	0,17407	-0,02752	-0,09635	-0,06517
% social rent	<b>0,85592</b>	0,19059	-0,20599	0,07617	0,09187
% overcrowded	0,18064	0,10144	0,07257	<b>-0,83712</b>	-0,06756
% vacancies	-0,06907	-0,38525	0,21473	-0,16328	0,16154
<b>Explained variance</b>	<b>7,11072</b>	<b>2,93950</b>	<b>1,46604</b>	<b>1,29805</b>	<b>1,28491</b>
<b>Percentage of total variance</b>	35,554	14,698	7,330	6,490	6,425

The factors should be read as follows:

- **Factor 1: socio-economic and ethnic factor** – This factor is by far the most important one, explaining 35.5 percent of the total variance. This factor is defined by a large number of socio-economic variables (share of single parent families, proportion of unemployed persons, percentage of families on social welfare, proportion of households with either high or low incomes, percentage of working persons, some housing variables (shares of social rent housing and owner occupied housing), and also ethnic variables (proportion of Moroccans,

Turks, Surinamese, and Capeverdeans in the neighbourhood population). Remember that the figures about migrant groups in the Rotterdam case refer to both first- and second-generation immigrants. That all of these socio-economic and ethnic variables cluster in one factor indicates strong positive or negative correlations between these variables. In other words, in Rotterdam neighbourhoods with high shares of Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, and Capeverdeans in the neighbourhood population, there are also many single parent families, unemployed persons, social welfare claimants, low-income households, and social housing tenants. And in these neighbourhoods there are relatively few people working, few high-income households and few owner-occupiers. This is an important outcome. Different from other cities, social deprivation and ethnic composition of the neighbourhood appear to coincide. Once you know the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood you can do a fair guess about social deprivation, and vice versa.

- **Factor 2: demographic factor.** This factor describes the age structure of Rotterdam neighbourhoods and explains 14.7 percent of the total variance. It highlights a strong relationship between the presence of young people and large households. Neighbourhoods that have a high positive score on this factor house many juveniles (up to 15 years old), relatively larger households, and relatively few first and second-generation migrants from the EU and other Western countries. On the other hand, in Rotterdam neighbourhoods with relatively few juveniles and smaller households, there are more first and second-generation migrants from the EU and other Western countries. Note that the table does not contain information about the number of native Dutch residents in the neighbourhood. However, we know that the native Dutch generally live in the same neighbourhoods as migrants from other EU and other Western countries. As the native Dutch population is generally older than the non-Western migrant population, this explains why there are few juveniles and smaller households in the neighbourhoods with many migrants from EU and other Western countries.
- **Factor 3 is a demographic-ethnic factor** and refers to the proportion of elderly in the neighbourhood (high negative loading) and the proportion of EU and other non-western migrants. This factor accounts for 7.3 percent of the total variance. Again, there is an interesting interaction with the share of other non-Western migrants (medium positive loading). In neighbourhoods with few elderly there are relatively many citizens from other non-Western countries and also, to a somewhat lesser extend, from the EU and other Western countries.
- **Factor 4 is a socio-economic factor** but not related to the first factor. This factor accounts for 6.5 percent of the total variance. The central issue here is the share of overcrowded houses

in the neighbourhood. In places with relatively few overcrowded houses (a sign of prosperity in the neighbourhood), there are relatively many working individuals, and, again, many first and second-generation migrants from EU and other Western countries (and consequently also many native Dutch residents).

- **Factor 5 is an independent ethnic factor**, accounting for 6.4 percent of the total variance. This factor points out the specific position of the Antillean group in Rotterdam. Antilleans, unlike Moroccans, Turks and Capeverdeans, are apparently not concentrated in social deprived neighbourhoods. The same goes to a lesser extent for Rotterdam residents with a Surinamese or other non-Western background (note the relatively high positive factor loadings of both groups on this factor). Factor 5 thus stresses the different position of the Antilleans in the housing market and in the social structure of Rotterdam. In factor 1 we saw a strong relationship between the share of non-Western migrants, such as Moroccans, Turks and Capeverdeans in the neighbourhood and several indicators of social deprivation. Here we can observe that this general pattern does not go for the Antilleans (and, to a lesser extent, also not for the Surinamese and other non-Western migrant groups).

Factor 1 thus shows the main socio-economic and ethnic differences among Rotterdam neighbourhoods. On the map, the brownish darker coloured neighbourhoods have high positive scores on this factor (more social deprivation, more single parent families, more social housing, and more non-Western migrant groups, such as Moroccans, Turks and Cape Verdeans). The fifteen neighbourhoods with the highest scores on this central socio-economic and ethnic factor are: Feijenoord, Afrikaanderwijk, Katendrecht, Oud-Crooswijk, Nieuw-Crooswijk, Vreewijk, Wielewaal, Oude Westen, Tussendijken, Oude Noorden, Bospolder, Pendrecht, Hillesluis, Bloemhof, Schiemond. Most of these highly deprived neighbourhoods are situated in the Rotterdam inner city and are part of the Rotterdam districts Feijenoord and Charlois (both on the south bank of the river the Maas) or Delfshaven (located in the northern part of the city). Unlike some other Dutch cities with highly gentrified inner cities (such as Amsterdam), the Rotterdam deprived neighbourhoods are generally located in old inner city neighbourhoods. Pendrecht and Schiemond are exceptions between these old deprived neighbourhoods. Both neighbourhoods are relatively new. Pendrecht is a postwar 'garden-neighbourhood' at the edge of Rotterdam; Schiemond is a completely renovated district in the Rotterdam inner city. The bluish darker coloured neighbourhoods on the map have the highest negative scores on factor 1 (more prosperity, more owner-occupants, less single parent families, larger shares of native Dutch and Western migrants among the population). The ten neighbourhoods with highest negative scores of



factor 1 are: Oud-IJsselmonde, Pernis, Schieveen, Hillegersberg-Zuid, Kralingse-Bos, Terbregge, Kralingseveer, Kop van Zuid, Strand en Duin, Nesselande. Most of these neighbourhoods are located on the north bank of the Maas, and generally further away from the inner city. These are partly more dignified older districts, partly city expansion on the east or north side of the city build in the 1960s and 1970s. However, there is one major exception on the general rule that the more well-to-do neighbourhoods are located further away from the inner city: the Kop van Zuid. This is a new neighbourhood, build in the 1990s, directly on the south bank of the Maas. The project of building this neighbourhood was initiated by the Rotterdam local government in order to attract the middle classes to the inner city again, which apparently succeeded.

**Factor 1**




Table 4 gives some more information about the 15 most deprived and the 10 most well-to-do Rotterdam districts.

**Table 4. A portrait of the 15 most deprived and 10 most well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods**

<b>districts</b>	<b>% single parent families</b>	<b>% working</b>	<b>% unemployed</b>	<b>% social benefit claimants</b>	<b>% low-income households</b>	<b>% non-Western Immigrants</b>	<b>% social rent</b>
<i>Most deprived Rotterdam districts</i>							
1 Feijenoord	19,8	44	19,1	34	31	76	91,7
2 Afrikaanderwijk	13,3	42	19,8	33	30	77	84,1
3 Katendrecht	17,2	50	17,3	33	27	54	80,9
4 Oud-Crooswijk	13,6	50	14,3	32	27	49	87,3
5 Nieuw-Crooswijk	12,3	53	13,4	29	30	47	93,3
6 Vreewijk	11,6	55	12,1	27	19	21	82,2
7 Wielewaal	11,2	56	12,1	29	18	9	82,0
8 Oude Westen	13,7	51	12,6	30	28	62	73,1
9 Tussendijken	11,7	49	13,6	30	28	69	65,3
10 Oude Noorden	13,1	54	13,2	28	26	53	65,0
11 Bospolder	12,9	51	13,5	28	29	71	70,1
12 Pendrecht	15,3	52	14,9	31	23	53	66,5
13 Hillesluis	13,8	48	17,3	29	28	74	54,4
14 Bloemhof	12,0	47	16,5	31	28	63	57,7
15 Schiemond	21,6	53	12,2	30	29	65	74,0
<i>Most well-to-do Rotterdam districts</i>							
1 Oud-IJsselmonde	6,7	75	5,4	13	9	20	16,2
2 Pernis	7,8	72	3,5	13	7	7	25,9
3 Schieveen	x	57	6,2	30	x	16	7,3
4 Hillegersberg-Zuid	6,6	75	3,2	10	8	8	2,8
5 Kralingse-Bos	x	60	0,0	15	x	x	39,1
6 Terbregge	9,9	76	2,8	9	10	14	20,6
7 Kralingseveer	7,8	74	3,1	12	11	8	17,6
8 Kop van Zuid	2,4	78	1,8	5	x	34	0,0
9 Strand en Duin	4,0	71	1,6	11	x	4	2,1
10 Nesselande	4,0	87	2,3	5	x	16	18,3
Rotterdam	10,1	61	9,6	21	17	36	50,8

There appears to be a relationship between social deprivation and the share of single parents households in the neighbourhood. All of the 15 most deprived neighbourhoods have a higher than average share of single parent households in the neighbourhood population. This relationship between social deprivation and single parenthood can be explained since, at least in the Dutch context, single parent families have relatively high risks of being poor, being unemployed, and consequently living from social benefits. However, not alle deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods have extreme numbers of single parent families. This is probably also related to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood population. Neighbourhoods with large shares of Antillean, Surinamese, Capeverdean or other African immigrant groups in the neighbourhood population have more single parent families than neighbourhoods where other non-Western immigrant groups such as Turks and Moroccans are overrepresented in the neighbourhood population. In the neighbourhood of Schiemond, where many Antillean, Surinamese, Capeverdean migrants and their offspring live, more than 21% of all households are single parent families. In the more well-

to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods, the shares of single parent families in the neighbourhood population are consistently lower than the city average.

The next two columns of table 4 show the shares of working people (as a percentage of all residents in the working age, 14-65 years) and of unemployed persons in the most deprived and most well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods. Both figures are, of course, very interrelated. In the 15 most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods the labour market participation is consistently lower than the city average and the unemployment is consistently higher than the Rotterdam average of almost 10 percent. However, the unemployment figures differ between the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods ranging from almost 20% in the Afrikaanderwijk – a predominantly immigrant neighbourhood in the southern part of Rotterdam – to around 12% in neighbourhoods like Vreewijk, Wielewaal, and Schiemond. In the most well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods the labour market participation is consistently higher and the unemployment is consistently lower than the city average.

The fourth column in table 4 shows the number of individuals per neighbourhood living from some kind of social benefit (social assistance, unemployment, incapacity). This figure, although it is not included in the factorial analysis, is very telling. It shows us that in most of the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods every fourth up to every third individual with an independent income derives this income from social benefits. Neighbourhoods with such large shares of social benefit claimants have been labelled as ‘social benefit neighbourhoods’: these are neighbourhoods where work seems to be the exception and living from social benefits appears to be the rule. However, the situation in these neighbourhoods has improved since the mid-1990s. In 1994, not less than 50% of all residents with an independent income of Rotterdam neighbourhoods like Afrikaanderswijk, Wielewaal, Schiemond, Katendrecht, and Spangen derived their income from some kind of social benefit (Engbersen & Snel 1996).

The fifth column in table 4 shows the number of households below the poverty line in Rotterdam neighbourhoods. Rotterdam is generally considered to be a poor city. ‘Poverty’ is defined here as having a standardised household income below the so-called ‘low-income threshold’ as defined by Netherlands Statistics (CBS). In 2005, a low income for a single-person household was 870 euro, for a couple with two children it was 1640 euro (nett monthly household income). Also in 2005, 10% of all Dutch households had an income below this low-income threshold (SCP/CBS 2007). In Rotterdam, the share of low-income households is significantly higher (17%). In the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods, the shares of poor households are again significantly higher (up to 30 percent of all households). In only two of the most deprived neighbourhoods, the shares of poor households are consistent with the city average (in Vreewijk


and Wielwaal). In the most well-to-do neighbourhoods, the shares of poor households are obviously lower than the city average.

The sixth column of table 4 shows the share of non-Western immigrants and their offspring in the total neighbourhood population. The figures make very clear that the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods are generally places with large numbers of non-Western immigrants. Again, Wielewaal and Vreewijk are the exceptions. Although these neighbourhoods belong to the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods, they house much less non-Western immigrants and their offspring than the city average (of 36 percent). Most well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods, on the other hand, have relatively few residents with a non-Western ethnic background. A remarkable exception is, however, de Kop van Zuid. We already mentioned this newly build neighbourhood on the south bank of the river the Maas that was created to make the Rotterdam inner city again attractive for the middle classes. The Kop van Zuid is indeed among the most well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods, but it has a remarkable high share of non-Western immigrants and their offspring in the local population. This shows that having a non-Western immigrant background not necessarily implies having a low socio-economic status. Later in this chapter we will again point out processes of social mobility and middle class formation among some non-Western migrant groups (especially postcolonial migrants coming from the Dutch Antilles or Suriname).

The last column of table 4 shows the incidence of social rent housing in Rotterdam neighbourhoods. More than half of all dwellings in the city of Rotterdam concerns social rent housing. However, in most of the most deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods the stock of social rent dwellings is even much larger (up to more than 90 percent in the neighbourhood of Feijenoord). Such large numbers of social rent housing are nowadays considered as a problem. Although social rent housing provides affordable housing for low-income groups that are prominently present in the Rotterdam population, it makes the city unattractive for the middle classes the municipal authorities want to attract to the city. Some deprived Rotterdam neighbourhoods (specifically Hillesluis and Bloemhof) have significantly lower shares of social rent housing. However, the housing situation in these two neighbourhoods can be even worse than in the neighbourhoods with predominantly social housing. In neighbourhoods like Hillesluis, Bloemhof, and some other parts of the south of Rotterdam there are many private rent dwellings. Since many private homeowners insufficiently maintain their dwellings these neighbourhoods are characterised by deteriorating stocks of houses. The more well-to-do Rotterdam neighbourhoods have much less social rent housing. Here, most dwellings are private owned family houses.


As mentioned previously, factor 2 describes the demographic structure of the population. Neighbourhoods with the highest positive score on this factor have relatively many juveniles (up to 15 years old) among the population, larger families, and few people coming from EU and other Western countries. Neighbourhoods with the highest positive scores on this factor are both rather well-to-do districts at the east fringe of the city (neighbourhoods like Nesselande, Terbregge, and Kralingseveer; but also inner city districts we already mentioned as the most deprived parts of Rotterdam (neighbourhoods like Spangen, Feijenoord, Hillesluis, and Hoogvliet-Noord). This socio-economic diversity among those neighbourhoods with high positive scores on factor 2 shows again that this factor is unrelated to the previous factor. Neighbourhoods with high negative scores on this factor are neighbourhoods with relatively few juveniles, smaller families (or more single-person households) and a considerable proportion of EU and other Western migrants. However, as we mentioned earlier, since the EU and other Western immigrants tend to live in the same neighbourhoods as the native Dutch population, these are also the neighbourhoods with the largest shares of native Dutch residents. All of these neighbourhoods in the more gentrified parts of the Rotterdam inner city (neighbourhoods like Kop van Zuid, Stadsdriehoek, Stationskwartier, Zuidplein, Dijkzigt). These are also neighbourhoods that house relatively many students and other young singles (but not juveniles younger than 15 years).

**Factor 2**



Factor 3 is a demographic-ethnic factor. Neighbourhoods with high positive scores on this factor have few elderly among the population and have a mix of immigrants from other non-Western countries and from the EU and other Western countries in the neighbourhood population. Since EU and other Western immigrants tend to live in the same neighbourhoods as the native Dutch, these are also neighbourhoods with relatively many native Dutch residents. Neighbourhoods with the highest positive scores on this factor are all located in the Rotterdam inner city (Stationskwartier, Kop van Zuid, Nieuwe Werk). But also some of the newer neighbourhoods at the Rotterdam east fringe have relative high scores on this factor (Nesselande, 's-Gravenland, Terbregge). Oppositely, neighbourhoods with high negative scores on this factor have a high proportion of elderly residents and few immigrants from other non-Western countries and from the EU and other Western countries (and consequently many few Dutch residents). This goes for neighbourhoods such as Zuiderpark, Kralingse-Bos, Wielewaal, Zestienhoven, Ommoord, and Groot-IJselmonde


**Factor 3**



Factor 4 is, again, a socio-economic factor. Neighbourhoods with high positive scores on this factor have relatively many working individuals, high-income households, and EU and other

Western immigrants (and consequently also many native Dutch residents). Neighbourhoods with high negative scores on this factor have many overcrowded houses (a sign of economic deprivation in the neighbourhood), many unemployed individuals and social welfare claimants, and also relatively many residents with a Turkish ethnic background. The neighbourhoods showing high positive scores are 's-Gravenland, Oosterflank, Beverwaard, Ommoord, Zevenkamp and Prinsenland. These are generally postwar, middle-class neighbourhoods with predominantly family housing at the eastern fringe of Rotterdam. Neighbourhood such as Schieveen, Landzicht, Bloemhof and Afrikaanderwijk have high negative scores meaning that there is a high percentage of overcrowded houses and few working residents and few EU and other Western migrants.


**Factor 4**



Factor 5, finally, is an ethnic factor but one that is not related to socio-economic deprivation. Whereas Moroccan, Turkish and Capeverdean migrant groups are heavily concentrated in deprived urban areas, this appears to be different for Antillean migrants. Neighbourhoods with many Antilleans, and to a lesser extend also Surinamese and so-called 'other non-Western migrants', are not necessarily poor areas as becomes clear with this factor. Some neighbourhoods with high positive scores on factor 5 (indicating relatively large numbers of Antilleans,

Surinamese and ‘other non-Western migrants’) are typical deprived neighbourhoods (Tarwewijk, Pendrecht, Katendrecht, Delfshaven), but other neighbourhoods with high scores on this factor are rather well-to-do (Dijkzicht, Kop van Zuid). The explanation is that particularly postcolonial migrants from the Dutch Antilles and from Surinam are not necessarily deprived citizens. The Antillean community in the Netherlands has huge internal social differences. The first Antillean migrants arriving in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s generally had a middle-class background. Many of them came to the Netherlands for educational reasons and stayed after finishing their education. These early migrants and their offspring are now generally well-integrated citizens in the Netherlands. However, later migrants coming from the Dutch Antilles as from the 1980s were members from the Antillean lower classes, among them many single mothers and other young adults with little education and few social changes. For both the Antillean and Surinamese migrant categories goes that the second-generation is quite well integrated in Dutch society and able to obtain better social positions. As various Dutch migrant studies, there are signs of social mobility and a growing middle class in these migrant categories (Odé 2002; Cain 2007; **other sources ???**). As a result, Rotterdam residents with an Antillean and Surinamese background live less concentrated in the poorest neighbourhoods of the city than for instance residents with a Moroccan, Turkish or Capeverdean ethnic background.

**Factor 5**





#### 4. Ethnic geography of Rotterdam

##### *Immigrant population in Rotterdam*

We already reported what the main immigrant groups are in the Dutch context. Table 4 gives an overview of the size and composition the migrant populations in Rotterdam. Again, we would like to repeat that these figures not only include non-nationals or foreign-born immigrants, but both first and second-generation immigrants, irrespective of their formal citizenship. Almost half of the Rotterdam population (46%) has an immigrant background, meaning that either the person him or her self or at least one of his or her parents were born outside the Netherlands. 10% of the Rotterdam population are immigrants or their offspring coming from EU and other Western countries, 36% of the Rotterdam population are immigrants or their offspring coming from non-Western countries. Rotterdam has the highest proportion of first and second-generation migrants from non-Western countries (or ethnic minorities) of all Dutch cities. The largest non-Western immigrant groups in Rotterdam, like in the Netherlands in general, are the Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans. The share of Antilleans in Rotterdam is larger than in the other Dutch cities. A local peculiarity of Rotterdam is the relatively large share of first- and second-generation immigrants from the Cape Verdies (2,6% of the Rotterdam population)

**Table 12: Numbers of first and second generation immigrants in Rotterdam (2007)**

	N	In %
Native Dutch	317426	54.3
From EU & Western countries	58055	9.9
From non-Western countries	208565	35.7
Surinamese	51956	8.9
Antilleans	19290	3.3
Turks	45459	7.8
Moroccans	37141	6.4
Cape Verdeans	15024	2.6
Other non-Western immigrants	39695	6.8
Total population	584046	100

**Source:** COS (2008) (own computation)

## *History of immigration to the Netherlands and to Rotterdam<sup>2</sup>*

### *Surinamese*

Surinam, on the northwestern coast of South America, was part of the Dutch colonial territories empire until its independence in 1975. Due to these colonial ties, there has been a long tradition of migration from Surinam to the Netherlands. Until the mid-1970s, Surinamese migrants that arrived in the Netherlands were mainly students and members of the Surinamese middle classes. They came to work in the Netherlands as teachers, nurses, administrative personnel, and other skilled workers. In the years following Surinam's independence, there was a massive emigration from Surinam to the Netherlands. Nowadays, nearly 336.000 people of Surinamese origin live in the Netherlands. The Dutch Surinamese population consists of three different Surinamese ethnic groups: Creoles, Hindustani and Javanese. Most Surinamese immigrants and their offspring have Dutch citizenship.

Surinamese are not evenly dispersed throughout the Netherlands. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the years of the mass emigration from Surinam to the Netherlands, the Dutch government tries to spread the newcomers throughout the country. However, as almost three quarters of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands ended up in the urban centres in the Randstad (the western part of the Netherlands), these policies of dispersal proved to be unsuccessful. With 52,000 persons or 9 percent of the total population, the Surinamese are the largest immigrant group in Rotterdam.

### *Antilleans*

The Netherlands Antilles are also part of the former Dutch colonial realm. The Dutch Antilles are located in the Caribics and consist of three larger islands (Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao) and three smaller islands. The islands are now an autonomous part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Like the Surinamese immigration, the Antillean immigration was quite limited for a long time and consisted mainly of students and other persons with a middle class background. Since the mid-1980s the immigration from the Dutch Antilles to the Netherlands increased significantly. Also the social composition of the Antillean immigrants changed dramatically as many low-skilled juveniles and single parent families from the so-called Antillean popular classes came over to the Netherlands. As a result, the Antillean community of roughly 130,000 people is nowadays considered as one of the most problematic immigrant groups in the Netherlands. The Antilleans

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<sup>2</sup> Based on Vermeulen & Penninx (2000) and website Sporen van Migratie, archive Rotterdam (2008).

live rather concentrated in Rotterdam and in some other Dutch cities (such as Dordrecht and Den Helder).

### *Turks*

The first Turkish immigrants arrived as so-called 'guest workers' in the Netherlands in the early 1960s. As the growing Dutch economy needed low-skilled workers, the Dutch government entered into a workers recruitment agreement with Turkey in 1964 (after earlier agreements with Italy, Spain and Portugal). After that, the number of Turkish workers in the Netherlands increased rapidly. The peak of Turkish labour migration occurred in the early 1970s. In the economic recession following the first oil crisis of 1973, the foreign workers recruitment was nearly brought to a halt, and the Turks were no longer admitted to the Netherlands as labour migrants. Turkish immigration, however, continued practically unabatedly as more and more Turkish guest workers brought their families over to the Netherlands ('family reunification'). Turkish immigration to the Netherlands still continues, as many Turkish people living in the Netherlands tend to find their marriage partners in the country of origin ('marital immigration' or 'family formation'). In 2007, there are almost 370,000 residents with Turkish origins living in the Netherlands. Of course, Rotterdam with its industrial history has a fair share of this population category. Almost 8% of the Rotterdam population is of Turkish origin. Little more than half of all Turkish-Rotterdam residents were second-generation immigrants, born in the Netherlands.

### *Moroccans*

As was the case with Turkish immigrants, the first Moroccan immigrants also came to the Netherlands as guest workers. Although it was expected that these Moroccan (or Turkish) workers would return home over the course of time, many of them remained in the Netherlands and eventually brought over their families. The conditions for Moroccan immigration changed radically in 1973, after the first oil crisis. The Dutch government put a stop to the formal labour recruitment from Morocco and other the Mediterranean countries. As labour migration was no longer grounds for admission to the Netherlands, family reunification – and later 'marital immigration' – became the primary form of immigration for Moroccans to the Netherlands. In 2007, almost 330,000 residents with a Moroccan descent lived in the Netherlands. In the same year, ample 37,000 residents with a Moroccan background lived in Rotterdam (6.4% of the overall Rotterdam population). Around half of the Moroccan Rotterdam residents belong to the second generation.


### *Cape Verdeans*

The Cape Verde Islands is a group of islands located more than 500 kilometres of the coast of West Africa. The first Capeverdean immigrants to the Netherlands were mainly sailors that applied for jobs on Dutch ships. That is also the reason why only Rotterdam with its harbour has a significant Capeverdean community in the Netherlands. The second period of immigration from the Cape Verdies to the Netherlands started in the mid-1970s, after the independence from the Cape Verdies from Portugal. This immigration wave coincided with the economic crisis of the 1970s. The immigrants were this time not sailors or unskilled workers, but school leavers, lower civil servants, teachers and fired soldiers. In these years the process of family reunification also began. The third wave of immigration from the Cape Verdies to the Netherlands started in the early 1990s. Most immigrants that came after 1991 are well educated young people that are looking for better education and job possibilities. Also, more and more Capeverdean women have left their country independently. In Rotterdam their number even exceeds that of men.

### *Geographic dispersion of immigrants in Rotterdam*

As we already mentioned, non-Western immigrants are not dispersed evenly over all parts of the city. In 18 Rotterdam neighbourhoods, non-Western immigrants and their offspring (or 'ethnic minorities') are even the majority of the neighbourhood population. In five Rotterdam neighbourhoods, the percentage of ethnic minorities is 70 percent or higher (see figure 3). Figure 3 also shows the dynamics of this process of 'colouring' of urban neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. The figure shows the share of ethnic minorities (non-Western immigrants and their offspring) in the local population in both 1993 and 2008. Various Rotterdam neighbourhoods in figure 3 already had large shares of ethnic minorities in the early 1990s. However, some neighbourhoods – notably Tarwewijk and Pendrecht – show dramatic changes in the ethnic make-up of the neighbourhood in the years under examination. Particularly the Tarwewijk is locally well known as an area with pronounced urban problems (physical and social decline, crime, etc.). This may be not surprising since especially neighbourhoods with dramatic population changes are known for their social problems and ethnic tensions.


**Figure 3: Rotterdam neighbourhoods with at least 50% ethnic minorities in their population (2008)**



**Source:** COS, Rotterdam buurtmonitor (our own computations) (2008)

Figure 4 shows a more general picture of the ethnic composition of Rotterdam neighbourhoods. The figure clearly shows that most of the so-called ‘concentration neighbourhoods’ (neighbourhoods with at least 40% ethnic minorities [‘non-Western allochtonous’]) are located in the inner-city of Rotterdam, both north and south of central river crossing the city (‘de Maas’). The only exception is Hoogvliet-North, a part of Rotterdam outside the inner city that also houses a large share of ethnic minorities.

**Figure 4: Rotterdam neighbourhoods with large shares of ethnic minorities (2008)**



Source: COS, Rotterdam buurtmonitor (2008)

The neighbourhoods coloured blue in figure 4 have a share of non-Western immigrants and their offspring in the local population of at least 30%. In the neighbourhoods coloured light blue, the share of non-Western immigrants and their offspring is between 30 and 40%. In the neighbourhoods coloured dark blue, more than 40% of the local population can be categorized as non-Western immigrants and their offspring. However, as figure 4 also makes clear, there are also parts of Rotterdam with significantly lower shares on non-Western migrants and their offspring (the light and dark green areas).

#### *Segregation and contact indices*

Segregation and contact indices give a more accurate picture of the geographic dispersion of ethnic minorities (or any social category) over the different geographical units (neighbourhoods) of a city. The segregation index is the mostly used statistical measure to describe the spatial separation of different population categories over the city. The segregation index ranges from 100 (total segregation) to 0 (no segregation). The index describes the number of households that has to move to another neighbourhood in order to get a complete even distribution of all groups under examination over all neighbourhoods of the city. Table 14 shows the development of ethnic segregation in the four Dutch main cities.

**Table 14: Ethnic segregation in Dutch cities (*segregation index*)**

	1995	2002
Amsterdam	31,2	36
Rotterdam	43,3	39
Den Haag	51	46
Utrecht	32,9	37

**Source: ???**

Musterd (2005) already showed that ethnic segregation in Dutch cities is not particularly high. For instance, the segregation index for African-Americans in the USA is more than 60. Ethnic segregation is also much higher in various British cities (particularly when Bangladeshi or Pakistani are concerned), compared to the Dutch situation. According to Musterd (2005: 335) the fear for the development of 'black ghettos' in the Netherlands, as sometimes expressed by Dutch politicians, is unrelated to the facts about ethnic segregation in the Netherlands. An interesting outcome of table 14 is that in 1995, there were more segregated cities in the Netherlands (Rotterdam, The Hague) and less segregated cities (Amsterdam, Utrecht). In 2002, these differences in the magnitude of ethnic segregation more or less disappeared.

**Table 15: Spatial segregation in four main cities per population category (*segregation index*)**

	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Den Haag	Utrecht
Turks	42	45	51	42
Moroccans	40	40	48	43
Surinamese	33	22	34	22
Antilleans	35	30	28	16
Afghans	30	32	43	50
Iranians	17	25	28	33
Iraqi	29	31	43	42
(fmr)Joegoslavs	16	23	24	27
Somali	39	43	53	51

**Source:** W. van der Laan Bouma-Doff (2005, p. 9)

Table 15 also shows the ethnic segregation indices in the main four Dutch cities, but now broken down per ethnic category. It shows that in all cities the Turkish and Moroccan groups live more segregated in separated neighbourhoods than all other ethnic minority groups. Table 16, to conclude, gives an alternative statistical measure of ethnic segregation, the so-called contact indices. The table distinguishes three different kinds of contacts: contact with native Dutch, with the own group (ethnic isolation) and with other minority categories. The contact-indices again show that the Turkish group is more isolated than the other immigrant groups: people with a Turkish background have less contact with the native Dutch and more contact in their own group than all other minority categories. However, the differences with the Moroccan and Surinamese groups are small.

**Table 16: Spatial segregation in four main cities per population category (contact indices)**

		<i>Amsterdam</i>	<i>Rotterdam</i>	<i>Den Haag</i>	<i>Utrecht</i>
Turks	Native Dutch	45	38	35	58
	Own group	10	15	16	9
	Other minorities	45	47	49	33
Moroccans	Native Dutch	45	40	36	57
	Own group	15	10	11	17
	Other minorities	40	50	53	26
Surinamese	Native Dutch	43	48	45	66
	Own group	18	11	15	3
	Other minorities	39	41	40	31
Antilleans	Native Dutch	41	50	48	69
	Own group	4	5	3	1
	Other minorities	55	45	49	30
Afghans	Native Dutch	45	55	51	58
	Own group	1	0	1	1
	Other minorities	54	45	48	41
Iranians	Native Dutch	51	59	58	66
	Own group	0	0	0	0
	Other minorities	49	41	42	34
Iraqi	Native Dutch	49	55	48	62
	Own group	1	1	1	1
	Other minorities	50	44	51	37
(fmr.) Joegoslavs	Autochthones	50	49	54	63
	Own group	1	2	1	1
	Other minorities	49	49	45	36
Somali	Native Dutch	40	48	37	57
	Own group	0	1	1	1
	Other minorities	60	51	62	42

**Source:** W. van der Laan Bouma-Doff (2005, p. 10)

An interesting outcome of this table is, that the ‘older’ immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese) appear to be more isolated and have less contact with the native Dutch population than the newly arrived immigrant groups (Afghans, Iraqi, Irians, Somali). This refutes the old idea in migration literature that migrants become less isolated and more assimilated to the host society over time. The explanation is probably the size of migrant communities. The Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese groups have large communities in the Dutch cities that offer many possibilities for intra-ethnic contact and less need for inter-ethnic contact. The other groups are much smaller, offer less possibilities for intra-ethnic contact and consequently a greater need for inter-ethnic contact.



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